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ABSTRACT 
 
Saudi Arabia has been facing issues with completing construction projects on time 
and on budget. It has been documented that 70% of public construction projects are 
delayed. Studies have identified the low-bid delivery method as an important factor in 
causing such delays. The procurement system (low-bid) ignores contractors’ 
performance, and that is reflected in projects’ performance. A case study was performed, 
at a University campus in northern Saudi Arabia, identifying the major causes of project 
delays and cost overruns. The University was experiencing delays from 50% to 150%. 
Also, the actual project costs for four projects were examined and found that all four 
projects’ costs were higher than the original bid. The delay and cost overruns factors were 
gathered from the University engineers. A literature research identified one construction 
management method, best value performance information procurement system (BV 
PIPS), has documented multiple times its ability to improve project performance. In a 
comparison using the result of a case study and the results of (BV PIPS), Saudi Arabia’s 
delivery system was identified as a potential cause of project performance issues. The 
current procurement system was analyzed and modified to adapt with the (BV PIPS). The 
proposed procurement system using BV PIPS, which can be implemented in Saudi 
Arabia, was created with owner side. A large survey was conducted of 761 classified 
contractors and 43 universities’ representatives who rated causes of delay factors and cost 
overruns. The delay factors were then compared to delay factors experienced on Saudi 
construction projects, identified by performing a literature research. The comparison 
identified 14 important causes of delays. Moreover, the survey showed that classified 
contractors and universities’ representatives unsatisfied with low-bid, and they agreed 
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with BV PIPS which selecting vendors based on performance with price. The proposed 
model required a submitted level of experience (LE), risk assessment (RA), and value 
added (VA). Besides, project managers of vendors should be interviewed during the 
clarification phase. In addition, venders should submit the project’s scope, technical 
schedule, milestone schedule, and risk management plan. In the execution phase, vendors 
should submit a weekly risk report (WRR) and director’s report (DR).  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Saudi Arabia (SA) has been experiencing a construction boom for the past three 
decades. The construction industry is considered to be a big business, estimated to be 
worth more than $3.9 trillion yearly worldwide (Jackson, 2010). The estimated nearly 
investment budget for the Saudi construction industry from 1990 to 2000 was $234 
billion (Cordesman, 2002). The Saudi construction industry has been identified as the 
largest in the gulf countries as Saudi spent $575 B on construction projects from 2008–
2013 (Deloitte, 2013). For 2013 only, the Saudi Ministry of Finance allocated $48 billion 
for construction projects and $66 billion for 2014 (Arab News, 2014). In 2015, $32 
billion was spent on governmental construction projects (Ministry of Finance, 2015). 
However, many researchers over the last three decades have classified the performance of 
the Saudi construction industry as low. Three studies have identified that 70% of public 
construction projects in Saudi Arabia experience delays (Al-Sultan, 1987; Assaf & Al-
Hejji, 2006; Zain Al-Abedien, 1983). A study identified that the average delay 
percentages differed from the original contracts durations in Saudi Arabia by 10% to 30% 
(Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006) and in another study by 39% (Elawi, Algahtany, & Kashiwagi, 
2016). Furthermore, 80% of the public construction projects in Saudi Arabia faced cost 
overruns (Al Turkey, 2011). According to Arab News (2011), nonperformance in public 
construction projects in Saudi Arabia has more than $147 billion at stake. However, 
previous studies showed that one of the most important factors for the delays was the 
low-bid procurement system. In other words, contractors were selected based on price 
alone, ignoring contractor’s performance side. In addition to the construction project 
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delays, there were also cost overrun problems. The university campus being used as a 
case study is considered to be one of these projects. This campus is located in Northern 
Saudi Arabia and was established in 2005. It has been under construction since 2006. In 
This study delay factors, cost overruns, and the low-bid system at a university campus 
was analyzed and modified to using BV PIPS. 
Problem  
Previous studies have proven that construction performance in Saudi Arabia is 
poor. The case study university campus should have been completed in 2012. However, 
only two buildings of the university campus are operational, despite the fact that, as of 
2015, there are 22 buildings in the execution phase. Procurement system is considered a 
main factor that can increase the performance of projects. Government representatives 
usually base decisions on price when they procure construction projects. Previous studies 
have shown that low-bid is considered a major cause of construction project delay in 
Saudi Arabia (Albogamy, Scott, & Dawood, 2013; Al-Khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Alzara, 
Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, & Al-Tassan, 2016; Mahamid, 2013). When contractors are 
selected, the only focus is price. These low-bid projects are affected by substandard 
performance and delays, which often leads to increased costs. The government of Saudi 
Arabia has spent billions of dollars on construction projects, and they select contractors 
according to the lowest bid. However, these projects are often affected by cost overruns. 
This shows a contradiction in the way that contractors are selected because the system 
relies on cost criteria, but this leads to additional spending during the execution phase. 
Increasing project performance in Saudi Arabia requires reconsidering the procurement 
delivery system. 
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Research hypotheses  
1. BV PIPS has the ability to deal with important delay factors in Saudi Arabia (SA) 
2. The criterion of selecting contractors based on the lowest bid does not reflect the 
true price of projects. Also, the current project management methodology of the 
university’s owner uses has led to cost overruns.  
3. Classified contractors and universities’ representatives need to accept and 
implement the best value performance information procurement system (BV 
PIPS) elements in Saudi Arabia. 
Objectives of the Study 
1. Identify important delay factors in public projects in Saudi Arabia (SA) 
2. Identify causes for delays in projects on the university campus  
3. Show how delay factors at the case study university are classified within the 
results from the literature review and survey  
4. Show how BV PIPS can possibly deal with important delay factors to improve 
project performance in SA 
5. Persuade stakeholders in Saudi Arabia that selecting contractors based on price 
criterion alone costs the government more due to substandard construction 
performance and cost overruns. 
6. Identify current procurement process satisfaction of contractors and universities 
7. Use BV PIPS model to identify how to increase construction industry 
performance in SA 
8. Improve the current procurement system by a proposed model based on BV PIPS 
for SA 
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9. Determine if contractors and universities are interested in new procurement 
process improvements 
10. Identify if the proposed improvements by the PhD candidate are sufficient for 
classified contractors and universities’ representatives.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study a literature review was conducted on the performance of construction 
projects in Saudi Arabia and to explore essential factors that caused delays in public 
construction projects. Also, a relationship between low-price bidders and cost overruns 
were discovered. In addition, a literature review was conducted on the procurement 
delivery system issue and explained the best value performance information procurement 
system (BV PIPS), which has shown a higher level of construction performance than the 
low-bid system. Furthermore, case studies that used PIPS were discussed which approved 
a high level of performance with time, budget, and satisfaction. Next, the case study was 
conducted at the university in northern Saudi Arabia, which uses the low-bid system. A 
project director and 5 engineers at the university were interviewed to learn about the 
delay factors from an owner’s perspective. Moreover, data were collected that included 
only projects that have complete information available with regard to bidders and cost 
overruns. Four construction projects were selected for which the complete data could be 
analyzed to examine cost overruns and show that the actual costs were higher than the 
original proposed prices. Interviews identified the causes of the cost overruns and showed 
the method for selecting contractors. The current procurement system was studied at the 
university with the client side, which consisted of procurement, project staff, and director. 
A modified version of BV PIPS that could be implemented in Saudi Arabia was 
proposed. Then a survey was created to identify the following: 
1. Prioritizing causes of delay factors 
2. Prioritizing causes of cost overruns  
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3. satisfied with current model (Low-Bid) 
4. agreement with BV PIPS principles  
5. agreement with proposed model 
A survey was received from 761 classified contractors and 43 universities’ 
representatives, and survey data were subjected to statistical analysis to show validity and 
reliability of the results. 
Causes of Delay Factors 
After prioritizing the delay factors via survey, they were compared with important 
delay factors around the country, which were collected from extant literature. The 
comparison showed the important factors that causes of delay projects at case study 
campus. The study then explained how BV PIPS can deal with identified important delay 
factors to improve project performance in SA. 
Causes of Cost Overruns 
After prioritizing causes of cost overruns via survey and data of cost overruns 
case studies were compared with BV PIPS performance.  
Procurement System 
The survey whether classified contractors and universities’ representatives are in 
identify with current model, and agreement with BV PIPS principles and proposed 
model. 
Based on the result of the survey and on BV PIPS, the proposed model was 
created, which can be applied in Saudi Arabia.  
7 
 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Construction projects in Saudi Arabia have long-faced issues in regard to low 
performance. According to Al-sultan (1987), 70% of Saudi public projects faced time 
overages. Al-Barak (1993) reported that poor estimation practices and a shortage of 
skilled contractors cause project delays. Also, he believed that the national economy’s 
stagnation was a factor that caused delays (Al-Barak, 1993). In 1999, Al-khalil and Al-
Ghafly performed research to find the causes of delays in Saudi public utility projects. 
They investigated among owners, consultants, and contractors to determine who was 
responsible for project delays. They found that about 60% of projects begun between 
1985 and 1994 were delayed. The owner and the consultant often blame the contractor for 
the project delays. Conversely, a contractor often accuses the owner and consultant of 
delaying the project (Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999). Likewise, delayed projects impact 
both the owner and contractor. The owner loses revenue because of the uncompleted 
project, which forces him or her to rent temporary premises. Contractors also incur 
overhead costs because delayed projects keep them from getting another project (Assaf & 
Al-Hejji, 2006). Other studies mentioned that government departments, as owners of 
public projects in Saudi Arabia, are affected by the disruption of public development 
plans, the financial execution plan, and community annoyance caused by the delay of 
particular projects. Whereas, a contractor is influenced through; increasing period of 
project, increasing overhead cost, and hindering contractor of finding another business 
opportunity (Al-Kharashi & Skitmore, 2009). All parties aim to complete construction 
projects on time. However, many previous studies found major factors that affected the 
8 
 
performance of organizations working on construction projects. Al-Karashi and Skitmore 
found about 112 factors responsible for project delays. They also obtained about 39 more 
factors from respondents in their study. The authors found 131 total factors, which are 
listed in the Appendix A (Al-Karashi & Skitmore, 2009). So, here in this study classified 
the related causes in four levels: owner-related causes, contractor-related causes, 
consultant-related causes, and other-related causes. An intensive review of significant, 
frequent factors that had appeared in previous studies about the Saudi Arabia construction 
industry was then made. 
Important Delay Causes in Saudi Arabia 
Owner-Related Causes 
Owners play an active role in reducing project delays. Therefore, project period is 
considered to be a delay factor. Owners often cannot predict how long projects will take 
(Albogamy et al., 2013; Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Mahamid, 2013). Extension time is 
one of the owner-related delay factors. The owner approved extension time on 87% of 
projects (Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999). In addition, owners postpone making progress 
payments to other parties, which becomes another delay factor (Albogamy et al., 2013; 
Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Al-Kharashi & Skitmore, 2009; Al-Mudlej, 1984; Al-
Sedairy, 2001; Al-Subaie, 1987; Hazmi, 1987; Mahamid, 2013). Another study found that 
project orders changed by the owner disrupted contractors’ schedules, causing project 
delays (Albogamy et al., 2013; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). Also, reviewing and approving 
project documents were mentioned as factors leading to the postponement of projects 
(Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). Also, suspension work in construction projects by the owner 
affects the project’s performance (Al-Kharashi & Skitmore, 2009; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 
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2006). Also, a tendering system can be considered a significant factor that leads to the 
success of projects. Lowest bidding, which is the system applied in most Middle East 
countries, is also considered a reason for the prevalence of project delays in Saudi Arabia 
(Albogamy et al., 2013; Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Mahamid, 2013). Table 1 shows 
owner-related factors.  
Table 1  
Important Owner-Related Delay Factors in SA 
No. Owner-Related Causes of Delay 
1 Unrealistic project Period 
2 Extension of Time 
3 Postponing Progress Payments 
4 Changes in Project Orders 
5 Failure to Review and Approve Project Documents 
6 Suspension Work 
7 Lowest Bidding Practices 
  
Contractor-related causes 
Al-Barak noted that the main causes of contractors' failures were skill shortages, 
poor estimation practices, and poor decision-making (Al-Barak, 1993). Project duration is 
also a contractor-related delay factor when the contractors have poor planning and 
scheduling skills (Albogamy et al., 2013; Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Mahamid, 2013). 
Qualified contractors may prevent project delays because of their experience, knowledge, 
and ability to field a trained workforce (Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999, Assa & Al-Hejji, 
2006). Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) found many factors related to contractors, such as 
conflicting views about subcontractors’ schedules in project implementation and poor 
subsurface conditions. Some contractors do not expect the worst things that could happen 
on the worksite, for instance, a high water table. Other recent studies found that a lack of 
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experience and a shortage of manpower are major causes of project delays (Al-Kharashi 
& Skitmore, 2009; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). Poor site management and supervision are 
also considered factors in the previously mentioned studies in addition to Mahamid’s 
(2013) study, which has many other negative effects on the construction industry. 
Moreover, when a contractor has cash flow problems, it will naturally affect the project’s 
completion (Albogamy et al., 2013; Al-khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Al-Kharashi & 
Skitmore, 2009; Assaf & Al-Hejji 2006). Table 2 contains contractor-related factors. 
Table 2  
Important Contractor-Related Delay Factors in SA 
No. Contractor-Related Causes of Delay 
1 Shortage of Skilled Workers 
2 Poor Estimation Practices 
3 Making Poor Decisions  
4 Project’s Duration  
5  Contractors’ Qualification 
6 Conflicts with Subcontractors’ Schedules 
7  Poor Subsurface Conditions  
8  Lack of Experience 
9  Manpower Shortage 
10 Poor Site Management and Supervision  
11 Cash Flow Problem 
 
Consultant-Related Causes 
The previous studies revealed that some of the delay factors can be linked to a 
consultant. According to Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006), a consultant is responsible for project 
delays by producing design documents and reviewing and approving design documents 
(Albogamy et al., 2013; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). Moreover, consultants are connected 
with diverse factors that cause project delays, such as failing to find mistakes and 
discrepancies in design documents and rigidity about deals (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). In 
addition, consultants need to have high levels of experience in order to perform their 
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roles. Projects also often require hiring of a number of consultants (Albogamy et al., 
2013; Al-Kharashi & Skitmore, 2009). Table 3 shows consultant-related factors. 
 
Table 3 
Important Consultant-Related Delay Factors in SA  
No. Consultant-Related Causes of Delay Factors 
1 Failure to Produce (or Producing Faulty) Design Documents 
2 Failure to Approve Design Documents 
3 Mistakes and Discrepancies in Design Documents  
4 Dealing Rigidly  
5 Consultant Performance  
6 Inadequate Number of Consultancy Employees  
  
Other Causes  
It is hard to classify some factors under the three main categories of owner, 
contractor, and consultant. For example, a delay in material delivery is considered a 
factor that has a degree of impact on project duration (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006). In 
construction projects, although it is difficult to coordinate among construction parties, 
communication and coordination increase the project’s chances of success. Conversely, 
increasing rework—doing a job more than one time—reduces project schedule control 
(Mahamid, 2013). Table 4 contains other factors that delay projects. 
Table 4 
Other Important Delay Factors in SA 
No. Other Causes of Delay 
1 Material Delivery Problems 
2 Communication and Coordination Failures 
3 Rework 
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The literature review showed that there are 27 significant, frequent factors that 
cause delays in construction projects in Saudi Arabia. There are six factors related to the 
project’s owner, nine factors related to contractors, nine factors related to consultants, and 
four others that cause of delays in Saudi public projects. 
Low-Bid and Cost Overruns 
Previous researchers have identified that the use of a bid delivery method based 
on low prices is a main cause of time overruns in the public construction projects in Saudi 
Arabia (Albogamy et al., 2013; Al-Khalil & Al-Ghafly, 1999; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; 
Mahamid, 2013). Selecting contractors based on the lowest bid is the most significant 
factor of delay projects in the field of construction (Banaitiene & Banaitis, 2006; Hatush 
& Skitmore, 1997a; Holt, Olomolaiye, & Harris, 1995; Huang, 2011; Merna & Smith, 
1990; Moore, 1985; Ng & Skitmore, 2001; Plebankiewicz, 2008, 2010; Singh & Tiong, 
2006; Waara & Brochner, 2006). According to Herbsman & Ellis (1992), project quality 
and time are not seen as being as important as low bids. Project performance is affected 
when vendors are selected based only on lowest price while ignoring time and quality 
(Holt, Olomolaiye, & Harris, 1994). In the United Kingdom, research encouraged the 
conversion to a performance-based norm from selecting vendors based on a low-bid 
delivery system, and results showed that the bids’ prices were not significant (Wong, 
Holt, & Cooper, 2000). Furthermore, a study identified that, regardless of the lowest bid, 
the selection of qualified contractors among other bidders would have a positive impact 
on project performance and cost (Iyer & Jha, 2005). Conversely, when contractors’ 
selection is based only on lowest price, unqualified contractors are encouraged to submit 
bids (Herbsman & Ellis, 1992). As a result, cost and time overruns in projects increase 
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due to the rewarding of projects to unqualified contractors (Banaitiene & Banaitis, 2006; 
Koushki, Al‐Rashid, & Kartam, 2005). The appropriate awarding to qualified contractors 
of construction projects would increase the success rates of projects (Alhazmi & 
McCaffer, 2000; Plebankiewicz, 2009). 
 
The selection of qualified vendors is, unfortunately, considered to be difficult 
(Sari & El-Sayegh, 2007), as project owners face complexity in the process of making 
decisions in selecting qualified contractors (Hatush & Skitmore, 1997b). Similarly, in 
Saudi Arabia, the selection of qualified contractors in the public sector is further affected 
by many obstacles such as the difficulty of decision-making because of a lack of 
experience, lack of capable consultants, and organizational stress of achieving the 
targeted projects’ scheduled duration and budget (Al-Busaad, 1997). Another study 
identified that the selection of qualified contractors is considered to be a challenge for 
owners’ procurement teams, which has a direct effect on the level of satisfaction and 
project accomplishment (Price & Al-Otaibi, 2010). Experts in the Saudi construction 
industry have found that the contractor-selection method usually fails to meet clients’ 
expectations, which causes many issues such as cost overruns, contractor failure, 
increasing changes, claims, and poor quality (Abu Nemeh, 2012). According to Al-Hazmi 
(1987), order modifications, cost overruns, contractor insolvency, and substandard quality 
are caused when unqualified contractors are awarded projects by submitting the lowest 
price.  
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A study identified that bidders aim to win by submitting the lowest bid when the 
competition is based only on price (Cheng, 2008). However, the possibility that the actual 
costs of projects are not being represented increases if a cost-based selection of 
contractors is applied (Olaniran, 2015). Another study showed that a contractor who has 
the lowest bid usually submits an estimate that is lower than the project’s actual estimated 
cost (Capen, Clapp, & Campbell, 1971). Consequently, selected contractors based on the 
lowest price model face profit and loss risks (Chao & Liou, 2007). Where other bidders 
would not accept that price, the lowest bidder will commit to the accomplishment of the 
project (Wolfsetter, 1996). To win bidding competitions in a low-bid procurement 
delivery method, several techniques have been used by bidders. Some bidders try to 
discover mistakes in the bidding documents to assist them in making change orders and 
claims for further work (Doyle & DeStephanis, 1990). The term predatory bidding refers 
to this approach, which is used to reduce contractors’ losses (Crowley & Hancher, 1995). 
Therefore, the actual costs are not reflected in many low-bid projects because of the 
continuous order changes and claims that bidders use (Bedford, 2009). This method is 
used by contractors to offset the losses created by submitting a lower bid (Zack, 1993). 
Olaniran (2015) surveyed 54 construction experts to identify the causes of low project 
performance related to cost-based contractor selection. Out of 22 identified causes, the 
highest ranked cause was that the selected bidders reduced their profit margins. The 
second cause was the low level of project control and monitoring applied by many 
contractors. The third cause was the incompetence of selected contractors. Consequently, 
in the long term, project quality can be affected when contractors decrease their profit 
margins (Han, Park, Kim, Kim, & Kang, 2007).  
15 
 
 
Rather than using the low-bid price method, a new procurement method, BV 
PIPS, can be adapted in Saudi Arabia to improve performance of projects. BV PIPS has 
proven to increase performance in construction projects. In this system, expert vendors 
are selected based on their performance while providing the lowest verified price. The 
vendors provide in a clarification phase a detailed proposal that includes the delivery 
information through a specific technique (Kashiwagi & Kashiwagi, 2011). Alzara et al. 
(2016) identified the major time overrun risk factors that cause poor performance in 
Saudi Arabia and recognized BV PIPS as a solution for overcoming these time-overrun 
risk factors.  
Best Value and Performance Information Procurement System (BV/PIPS) 
Dr. Kashiwagi created BV PIPS at Arizona State University (ASU) in 1991. BV 
PIPS has proven to minimize risks in projects and increase contractors’ performance 
through the use of experts (Kashiwagi, Sullivan, & Kashiwagi, 2009; Kashiwagi, 
Kashiwagi, Sullivan, & Kashiwagi , 2015). BV PIPS applies a special delivery 
environment that minimizes decision-making, direction, management, and control 
(Kashiwagi, 1991, 2010). In 2008, the International Council for Building (CIB) Working 
Commission W117 sanctioned a group (TG61) to perform a study using worldwide 
literature research to detect innovative approaches in construction documented an 
increase in performance of projects (Egbu, Carey, Sullivan, & Kashiwagi, 2008). The 
study filtered through more than 15 million articles, reviewed more than 4,500 papers, 
and identified the PIPS/PIRMS as the system that had published the most documentation 
showing an increase in construction performance on multiple tests. Performance of 
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projects is affected when they are based on value or on price. The industry structure 
model in Figure 1 shows the difference between methods based on value or on price. 
When the method is value based, projects show high levels of performance, and when it 
is based on price, they show substandard performance.  
Figure 1 
Industry Structure Model (Kashiwagi, 2014) 
 
 
BV PIPS focuses on finding and using expert vendors to increase the performance 
of projects. Performance metrics of PIPS projects were completed on budget, on time, 
and with a high level of quality. PIPS has been tested with over 1,800+ projects with $6.3 
billion project value ($4 billion in construction projects and $2.3 billion in non-
construction service projects). These projects’ metrics show a 98% rate of success in 6 
different countries and 31 states (Kashiwagi, 2014). PIPS increases project performance 
and efficiency while reducing project risks in comparison with the low-price bid method. 
The PIPS process shown in Figure 2 consists of four phases: pre-qualification (optional), 
selection, clarification, and execution. 
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Figure 2 
The Four Phases of BV PIPS (Kashiwagi, 2014) 
 
 Pre-qualification phase: This optional phase educates contractors about BV PIPS and 
how to submit dominant metrics to prove performance. 
 Selection phase: This phase has four filters to find the best value contractor for a 
project (see Figure 3). In filter one, contractors should submit project capability and 
their price, which contains three documents: level of expertise (LE), value added 
(VA), and risk assessment (RA). Each of the three documents should be two pages 
maximum. The second filter is an interview determining the contractors’ expertise. 
The interview is for the key people who will do the work such as project managers 
(PMs) to see if they are experts with a clear vision for the project as it progresses 
forward. The third filter is the committee-prioritized criteria, which weighs the 
previous steps. Weighting could use numbers from 1–10 or percentages. The fourth 
filter is a dominance check for the most appropriate contractor who provides 
information to minimize risk with the lowest cost. 
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 Clarification phase: This most important phase has the contractors clarify the plan and 
their offer. The contractor in this phase should explain what is outside the scope of the 
project while simplifying the proposal for the owner. Contractor and owner should 
clarify all aspects related to the project by providing a plan from the beginning of the 
project to the end, including the project scope, a milestone schedule, detailed 
technical specifications, and a risk management plan. 
 Execution phase: This final has the contractor submit a weekly risk report (WRR) and 
director’s report (DR) to the owner. The WRR is provided as an Excel document that 
explains the project activities and any deviations from the initial plan in terms of 
time, cost, and quality. The WRR also provides a milestone schedule, performance 
measurements, and a risk management plan. The DR contains a summary of all 
WRRs and provides each contractor’s performance and any risk that should be 
focused on.  
Figure 3 
Shown Selection Phase Filters (Kashiwagi, 2014). 
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The PIPS process has proven to be successful when applied. Table 5 demonstrates 
four case studies that used PIPS. These case studies indicate that 100% of the projects 
that applied PIPS were finished on budget, and most of the projects were accomplished 
on time. The table shows that there was no change in orders in all the projects, and the 
overall satisfaction received a high rating from project owners. PIPS considers both 
performance and cost in the selection of contractors, not just price (CFMA, 2006; Chan & 
Chan, 2004; Egan, 1998; PBSRG, 2010; Kashiwagi, 2010, 2011). 
Table 5 
Examples of PIPS Case Studies  
Case studies 
Criteria 
United 
Airlines 
Utah 
The University of 
Hawaii 
Minnesota 
Duration of execution 1996–1998 1999–2011 2000–2005 2005–present 
Number of projects 32 4 11 247 
Cost  $ 13 Million $ 64,405,100 $ 1,658,192 $97.2 Million 
Overall satisfaction 100% N/A 92% 95% 
On time 98% 100% 100% 100% 
On budget 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Change orders 0% 0% N/A 0% 
(Adapted from Kashiwagi, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 4 
A UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY 
The university campus selected for this case study is located in northern Saudi 
Arabia. This campus consists of 21 colleges in addition to other facilities and serves 
approximately 26,000 students. The university campus required a number of construction 
stages to be completed.  
Causes of Delay Factors 
In an interview with the director of department of projects and five engineers at 
the university campus was conducted on 14-15 March, 2015 via Skype. It was discovered 
that of a total of 22 projects at the university, 17 were delayed. There were also 15 
projects under construction on the university campus. There are another eight projects 
that are currently in the design stage. However, the planned operation of the university 
campus should have begun in 2012. Conversely, two buildings were operational until 
2015. Hence, the percentages of delay in overrun time at the university were between 
50% and 150%. It was also found that 99% of the university projects overran projected 
costs. So, the delay of construction projects at the university was caused by many factors 
that have links to the owner, contractors, consultants, and other factors. 
Owner-Related Causes at the Case Study 
It is obvious that there is no clear vision for projects. Also, there were only 
incomplete ideas when the university planned its construction projects. As a result, most 
of the university’s projects do not reflect reality. There are huge projects with unrealistic 
requirements. Because of this, after a contractor delivers a building, it is found that its 
design is not appropriate for use, which happens because the designers had been 
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controlled by the owner during the design stage. In addition, 88% of the university’s 
projects are not well thought out, and these projects’ budgets do not correspond with their 
design requirements. Consequently, when selecting a contractor, the owner often makes 
the decision to remove some work from the project in order to get the contractor price 
closer to the budget. The owner will find someone to complete these works later. This 
action delayed projects at the university because the removed works were based on work 
being done by the first contractor. For example, the first contractor may need the air duct 
system to be completed, which is removed from first contractor’s works to another bid, to 
install a false ceiling. Consequently, the tendering system takes a long time to sing with a 
contractor and adds to the difficulty of governmental proceedings. Other factors are also 
related to the owner.  
Contractors who want to obtain university projects must have classifications from 
the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. There are five classes, and each class shows 
the highest financial limit within the contractors’ abilities. Owners may also make the 
decision to prevent low-class contractors from partaking in the competition by merging 
similar projects into one tender. However, that method increases the projects’ sizes, which 
limits the university’s ability to monitor them. Additionally, it is clear that there are poor 
organization within the project management department. Although there is no ability to 
manage many projects simultaneously, it is clear that there are many too many projects to 
progress through the implementation process. In addition, some delayed projects were 
found to need approval in order to use a particular system. However, the holder of 
authority was not a specialist, which led to slow approval. Also, the owner’s employees 
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were responsible for delaying projects at the university because they delayed progressive 
payments to the contractors. Table 6 shows owner-related delay factors at the case study. 
Table 6 
Owner-Related Delay Factors in the Case Study 
No. Owner-Related Causes of Delay at the case study 
1 Lack of Vision 
2 Design Requirements Do Not Reflect Reality 
3 Designer is Controlled by Owner 
4 Lack of Project Budget 
5 Wrong Decision-Making by Owner 
6 Not Following the Conditions Solidarity Among Contractors 
7 Inadequate Project Management Department 
8 Late Review and Approval of Design Documents by Owner 
9 Changing Consultant During Implementation 
10 Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors 
  
Contractor-Related Causes at the Case Study  
 The literature review found that one common delay on university projects was 
poor contractor performance. One project is separating itself from its contractor because 
of poor performance, the contractor’s lack of qualifications, and a conflict among 
company partners. Withdrawing from a construction project sometimes requires 
procedures that can take up to ten years to complete. In addition, another contractor-
related factor is a lack of experience. Although contractors must review the proposal and 
inform the owner about items that are not mentioned in the proposal, contractors and 
consultants discovered many items that were not mentioned in the project proposals but 
were uncovered during implementation. Besides, despite contractors have about two 
months after selecting a contractors and before signing contracts, the contractor do not 
utilize that time for reviewing proposals to find any luck of works. Moreover, most 
contractors on the university’s projects lacked project-management skills. For example, 
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risks that could cause damage to projects were not clear to some project managers. The 
size of these projects often exceeded the contractors’ ability. In addition, some contractors 
had too many projects, and that affected their ability to finish projects on time. Also, 
contractors suffered from a shortage of manpower. Additionally, contractors delayed the 
payment of salaries to their laborers, which delayed projects when the laborers stopped 
working. Table 7 shows contractor-related factors at the case study. 
Table 7 
Contractor-Related Delay Factors in the Case Study 
No. Contractor-Related Causes of Delay at case study 
1 Poor Contractor Performance 
2 Conflict Among Company Partners 
3 Contractor’s Inadequate Qualifications 
4 Lack of Contractor Experience 
5 The Proposal Was Not Studied by the Contractor 
6 Contactor Lacked Project Management Skills 
7 Ability of Contractors 
8 Concurrent Projects 
9 Shortage of Manpower 
10 Delayed Payment to Laborers 
  
Consultant-Related Causes at the Case Study  
Poor consultant performance was also one of the causes of delay at the case study. 
Some consultants would like to extend their contract with the owner and, therefore, delay 
projects. Hence, some works were suspended by the consultant without a convincing 
reason. In addition, another delay factor is that many mistakes are often discovered in the 
blueprints during the implementation stage. Also, it is found that there is lack of 
consultancy employees and that causes delay construction at the university. However, 
when the consultants’ contracts have been finished and the projects have been delayed, 
the university’s owner has resorted to contracting with an international consultant for all 
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of the university’s projects, which will save about $8 million, as opposed to contracting 
with more than one local consultant. In addition, when the owner contracts with one 
consultant for all campus projects, it reduces the extension of contracts for each project 
on campus if one of these projects is delayed. However, when a new consultant begins 
work, he or she is faced with some difficulties, such as the fact that most construction is 
already underway and that he or she needs time to understand what is going. Table 8 
shows consultant-related factors at the case study. 
Table 8 
Consultant-Related Delay Factors at the Case Study  
No. Consultant-Related Causes of Delay Factors at case study 
1 Sub-par Consultants 
2 Delay Projects to Extend His/Her Contract with Owner 
3 Lack of Consultancy Employees 
  
Others Causes Of Delay at the Case Study 
Others causes of delay are some factors that are not related to the three 
construction parties. Bidder procedure was one of the factors delaying university projects. 
Also, some parts of the procurement system are not clear, which makes employees spilt 
projects into multiple stages, which causes delays. Additionally, there are a large numbers 
of projects around Saudi Arabia that lack the necessary materials. For example, one 
contractor could not supply granite because there was high demand for it from 
contractors. Moreover, new regulations from the Ministry of Labor caused a shortage of 
manpower, as opposed to older regulations that helped contractors find manpower easily. 
Table 9 contains other delay factors at the case study. 
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Table 9 
Other Delay Factors at the Case Study  
No. Other Causes of Delay at the case study 
1 Material Delivery Problems 
2 The Bidder System 
3 Unclear Procurement System 
4 New Worker Regulations 
  
The results showed that there were 27 factors that delayed projects at the 
university. These factors were shown from the owner’s perspective. Of the 27 delay 
factors, nine were owner-related, 10 were contractor-related, four were consultant-related, 
and four others were also found at the university. 
 
Cost Overruns 
 In April 2015, data were collected from the university to identify cost overruns 
when the criteria for selecting contractors were based on price alone. The delivery system 
at the university is based on the low-bid method. The study concentrated on obtaining 
complete data in regard to projects from the beginning of the project to the current time 
period. It was found that only four projects contained complete project information. That 
difficulty in collecting data existed because the university’s construction projects had 
transitioned through many stages and various responsible authorities since their execution 
in 2006. The four case studies showed all bidder costs for each project and which 
contractors had been selected. Moreover, the data contained the actual costs obtained 
during the execution phase. All personal information in regard to the contractors, 
including their names, was coded for this study. 
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In case study one, there were five bidders. The lowest bid came from Cont 
AAAFS at $31,605,544, and the highest was provided by Cont AAMASC at 
$59,333,506. The budget of project one was $34,538,933. In this example, the lowest bid 
won the project. When the final data were collected, the actual project only reached 24% 
completion and the actual price was $38,666,667, as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Data Regarding Case Study One 
Project 1 
Bidders Cost Result 
Budget of 
project 
Actual value at 
24% completion 
Percent of cost 
deviation 
Cont AAAFS $31,605,544 Selected 
$ 34,538,933 $38,666,667 22.3% 
Cont ATCCSA $42,185,088  
Cont FTCC $44,368,791  
Cont WIAC $47,940,058  
Cont AAMASC $59,333,506  
 
In case study two, five bidders applied. The lowest bid, provided by Cont AMG, 
was $24,645,130, whereas the highest bid, provided by Cont AAU, was $40,678,645. 
However, the lowest and second-lowest bidders left the competition with bids of 
$40,678,645 and $35,422,798, respectively. Then, from the three remaining contractors, 
the project owner selected the lowest bid, which was provided by Cont SACC at 
$37,317,248. However, the budget for project two was $35,733,333. After negotiations 
between the project owner and contractor, they signed the contract with a price of 
$34,666,667. The actual value, at 60% project completion, was $43,466,667. Table 11 
shows the details for case study two.  
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Table 11 
Data Regarding Case Study 2 
Project 2 
Bidders Cost Result 
Budget of 
project 
Actual value at 
60% completion 
Percent of cost 
deviation 
Cont AMG $24,645,130 Withdrawn 
$ 35,733,333 $ 43,466,667 25.4% 
Cont ATCCSA $35,422,798 Withdrawn 
Cont SACC $37,317,248 Selected 
Cont BCL $39,474,272  
Cont AAU $40,678,645  
 
 Five vendors bid on case study three. The lowest bid, provided by Cont DMC, 
was $38,501,294, whereas the highest bid, provided by Cont ACCL, was $45,530,146. 
The budget for project three was $40,000,000. The project owner selected the contractor 
with the lowest price, which was Cont DMC at $38,501,294. However, the actual value, 
at 80% completion, was $41,866,667. The bidding information is shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Data Regarding Case Study 3 
Project 3 
Bidders Cost Result 
Budget of 
project 
Actual value at 
80% completion 
Percent of cost 
deviation 
Cont DMC $38,501,294 Selected 
$ 40,000,000 $ 41,866,667 8.7% 
Cont AAF $40,397,923  
Cont BCL $40,883,645  
Cont ACC $41,919,152  
Cont ACCL $45,530,146  
 
The fourth case study focused on project four in which five contractors applied 
for the project. The lowest price, provided by Cont AMG, was $27,070,573, whereas the 
highest price, provided by Cont BCL, was $40,965,773. The budget for the project was 
$28,000,000. Therefore, Cont AMG won the competition with the lowest price, 
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$27,070,573. However, the actual value of the project at 62% completion totaled 
$39,200,000. The bidding information is shown in Table 13.  
 
Table 13 
Data Regarding Case Study 4 
Project 4 
Bidders Cost Result 
Budget of 
project 
Actual value at 
62% completion 
Percent of cost 
deviation 
Cont AMG $ 27,070,573 Selected 
$ 28,000,000 $ 39,200,000 44.8% 
Cont ATCCSA $ 33,554,292  
Cont SACC $ 36,304,503  
Cont AAU $ 40,434,665  
Cont BCL $ 40,965,773  
 
A University Case Study Analysis 
All of the four university case studies analyzed experienced cost overruns. As 
mentioned above, all of these projects used the low-bid delivery system. In case study 
one, a contractor, AAAFS, was selected based on its low bid; however, cost overruns of 
24% at completion totaled approximately $7,061,123. In case study two, there was 
approximately $6,149,419 in cost overruns in comparison to the bid price, and 
$8,800,000 in cost overruns at 60% completion in comparison to the signed contract. In 
case study three, a contractor, DMC, was selected due to the low bid price; however, this 
project experienced $3,365,373 in cost overruns. Moreover, the completion rate for that 
project was 80%. In case study four, a contractor, AMG, was selected due to its low bid 
price, and cost overruns reached $12,129,427. The percentage of completion in case 
study four was 62%. Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 show the selected contractors in comparison to 
other bidders and cost overruns. The total of cost overruns for these case studies is 
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$31,355,923. This wasted amount is equivalent to the cost of one university building. The 
low-bid system has been proven to offer substandard performance and cost overruns at 
the university campus. Table 14 shows the details in regard to cost overruns for the case 
studies. Although the instruction of the procurement system does not allow of cost 
overruns to exceeding 10% of the total value of the contract, however, dividing bids into 
several parts breaks this rule.  
Figure 4 
Selected Contractor and Cost Overruns in Case Study One 
  
Figure 5 
Selected Contractor and Cost Overruns in Case Study Two 
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Figure 6 
Selected Contractor and Cost Overruns in Case Study Three 
 
Figure 7 
Selected Contractor and Cost Overruns in Case Study Four 
   
 
 
Table 14  
Details of Case Study Cost Overruns 
 Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3 Case study 4 Average 
Contract Value $31.6 Million $34.6 Million $38.5 Million $ 27 Million 
$ 32.9 Million Total Cost of 
Contracts  
131.7 Million 
Percent overrun 22.3% 25.4% 8.7% 44.8% 23.3% 
Cost overrun $ 7.1 Million $8.8 Million $3.4 Million $12.1 Million $7.8 Million 
Total overrun $31.4 Million  
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Interviews identified seven risk factors that could cause cost overruns in Saudi 
Arabia. These seven risk factors were Change Orders, Bid Proposal Errors, Contractor’s 
Errors, Consultant’s Errors, Client’s Change of Scope, Dividing Bids into Several Parts, 
and Unforeseen Risks. 
Current Procurement System (Low-Bid) 
In July 2015, the university campus was visited by and met with the director and 
the procurement and project staff to understand the current procurement system and 
define BV PIPS for the university. The current procurement system in Saudi Arabia is 
subject to royal decree number M/58, enacted on September 27, 2006. This system 
selects bidders based on lowest price. Tenders and procurement laws include many basic 
principles and general provisions that consist of 81 articles. To improve the current 
procurement system, the fundamentals of the system must be understood. Public projects 
in Saudi Arabia are subjected to nine phases. The first phase involves the request for 
proposal (RFP). In the second phase, bids are announced in local newspapers and on Web 
sites. The next phase is that owners receive the proposals and check them to match 
instructions. Then when the committee and time are identified for opening of sealed-bids, 
the fourth phase is ready for financial analysis and prioritized by lowest price. In the fifth 
phase, all proposals should be evaluated by a technical analysis committee. Usually the 
lowest bidder is selected in the next phase. Then the lowest bidder moves to the 
negotiation phase with the owner. In this phase, the committee negotiates the price with 
the vendor before they sign a contract to add or remove some orders to reach a 
compromise value. If the vendor and negotiating committee are not able to compromise, 
the committee should then negotiate with the next bidder. After they sign the contract 
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with the vendor, they move to the next phase, which is the project awarding procedure. 
Then the vendor moves to the last phase, the execution phase, in which the owner hires 
consultants to inspect the implementation works. The current procurement system is 
shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 
This Shows the Current Procurement System in Saudi Arabia 
 
After BV PIPS is discussed with the client, it is possible to improve the current 
procurement system through modifications based on BV PIPS. The owner has the ability 
to ask bidders for any requirements that it wants to add to the bid. So, based on BV PIPS, 
it is possible to ask bidders to submit some documents in the evaluation proposals phase. 
These documents are level of experience (LE), risk assessment (RA), and value added 
(VA), which help to assess the bidders’ probable performance. Then the owner can select 
a bidder with the lowest price and high performance. When the selected bidder moves to 
the negotiation or clarification phase, then the PM should interview the vendor. Also, the 
owner can ask the vendor to submit the project’s scope, technical schedule, milestone 
schedule, and risk management plan. In case the vendor is not qualified for these 
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requirements, the committee should then negotiate with the next bidder. The owner then 
awards the project and moves to the execution phase. The vendor then submits a WRR 
and DR during implementation to the client, the Contractors’ Classification Agency, and 
the National Information Center. The documented data help the owner to anticipate the 
vendors’ performance in the future. 
 
34 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SURVEY 
A project director and five engineers at the university were interviewed, and they 
identified 27 delay causes and seven cost overrun causes in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
When BV PIPS was discussed with the client, the principles, phases, and filters of BV 
PIPS that could be added to the current procurement system were considered.  Then 
surveys were created which consisted of three parts; delay causes, cost overrun causes, 
and the proposed model (see Appendix B). Surveys were sent to more than 1,500 
classified contractors and 14 project departments of universities in Saudi Arabia for rating 
delay causes , cost overrun causes, and  the current procurement system and for BV PIPS 
to be accepted and applied in Saudi Arabia. A total of 761 classified contractors and 43 
representatives of universities responded to the survey. Survey data were subjected to 
statistical analysis to show validity and reliability of the results. 
 
Causes of Delay Factors 
Validity 
The construct validity was used to assess causes for project delays in Saudi 
Arabian universities. The Pearson’s correlation was used to evaluate the relationship 
between each delay cause (item) and the total representing all the items. Generally, a 
correlation value of 0.70 or higher reflects a strong (high) relationship, demonstrating that 
the item is consistent with the total of the items. Table 15 includes the results. 
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Table 15  
Construct Validity for Project Delay Causes (Overall Sample; N = 804) 
Item 
No. 
Delay Cause  
Owner-
Related 
Contractor
-Related 
Consultant
-Related 
Other 
Cause 
Overall 
Cause 
1 Lack of Vision 0.895    0.827 
2 Design Requirements Do Not Reflect Reality 0.602    0.912 
3 Owner Controlled Designer 0.933    0.902 
4 Lack of Project Budget 0.909    0.919 
5 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 0.937    0.910 
6 Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity Conditions 0.878    0.909 
7 Inadequate Project Management Department 0.923    0.901 
8 
Owner’s Late Design Document Review and 
Approval 
0.877    0.696 
9 Changing Consultant During Implementation 0.931    0.898 
10 Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors 0.917    0.916 
11 Poor Contractor Performance  0.922   0.895 
12 Conflict among Company Partners  0.918   0.925 
13 Inadequate Contractor Qualifications  0.940   0.878 
14 Lack of Contractor Experience  0.915   0.933 
15 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal  0.706   0.686 
16 Contactor Lacked Project Management Skills  0.873   0.927 
17 Contractor Ability  0.941   0.909 
18 Concurrent Projects  0.942   0.705 
19 Manpower Shortage  0.907   0.847 
20 Delayed Payment to Laborers  0.901   0.920 
21 Poor consultant performance   0.893  0.931 
22 
Consultant Delayed Projects to Extend His or 
Her Contract with Owner 
  0.943  0.895 
23 Lack of Consultancy Employees   0.954  0.878 
24 Material Delivery Problems    0.824 0.917 
25 Bidder System    0.918 0.919 
26 Unclear Procurement System    0.929 0.915 
27 New Worker Regulations    0.888 0.889 
 
The correlation values in Table 15 reflect a very strong relationship between each 
item of the delay cause and the cause related it belongs to, suggesting very satisfactory 
construct validity. All the values are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Most of the 
values are close to the integer 1, which represents the maximum value a relationship may 
reach. The minimum correlation values were observed between item 2 and the owner-
related causes (0.602) and observed minimum values between items 8 and 15 and the 
total items (0.696) and (0.686) respectively. These values express a moderate 
relationship.  
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Reliability 
 
The internal consistency approach for Cronbach’s alpha was used to describe how 
much the items pertaining to each dimension of the project delay causes (owners, 
contractors, consultants, and others) are reliable for measuring them. This method is 
based on calculating the ratio of the sum of an item’s variance to the variance 
representing the total items, and adjusting the answer to the number of items. The 
formula for calculating α is: 
 
 
Where: n is the number of items  
Vi is the item variance  
Vt is the total item variance 
The internal consistency value in Table 16 suggests a strong reliability. Generally, 
a value of 0.60 or greater expresses a good reliability. These provided values express a 
high degree of consistency, implying good reliability (the maximum possible value that 
can be obtained here is 1). 
 
Table 16  
Reliability Analysis Using Cronbach’s Alpha for Project Delay Causes (Overall Sample; 
N = 804) 
Dimensions No. of Items Value 
Owner-related Causes 10 0.969 
Contractor-related Causes 10 0.972 
Consultant-related Causes 3 0.916 
Other Causes 4 0.908 
Overall Causes 27 0.989 
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Prioritizing Causes of Cost Overruns 
The following formulas were used to calculate the included statistical indices: 
1. The mean:  
Mean (m) = Σ [a. (n/N)] 
Where: a is the statistical weight 
n is the weight frequency 
N is the sample size 
2. The standard deviation: 
 
 
Where: x is the response value 
 
x bar is the mean 
n is the sample size 
 
3. The frequency index (F.I.) is the percentage of the mean being assessed out of the 
highest response weight. 
(F.I.) = Σ [a. (n/N)] × 100/10 
Where: a is a constant of weighting given to each despondence (1 = not common, 5 = 
don’t know, 10 = common) 
n is the weight frequency 
N is the total number of responses for this research 
The results are presented in three levels: contractors, universities’ representatives, 
and the overall results of contractors and universities’ representatives. 
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The contractors’ sample. Table 17 reflects the descriptive statistics for the 
owner-related project delay causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the contractor’s 
perspective. The results show that item a8 (Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors) 
ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (95.70), and item a15 (Owner Did Not 
Follow Solidarity Conditions) ranks last because it recorded the smallest FI (57.0).  
 
Table 17  
Descriptive Statistics for Owner-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending 
Order (Contractor Sample; N = 761) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
2.8 3.7 93.6 9.57 1.72 95.7 1 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 7.4 13.9 78.7 8.64 2.76 86.4 2 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval  
8.3 15.5 76.2 8.48 2.88 84.8 3 
a14 
Owner’s Wrong Decision 
Making 
11.2 21.3 67.5 7.93 3.18 79.3 4 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
12.1 25.0 62.9 7.66 3.25 76.6 5 
a10 Lack of Vision 12.1 36.9 51.0 7.07 3.23 70.7 6 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 14.8 33.2 51.9 7.00 3.37 70.0 7 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
17.6 40.7 41.7 6.38 3.37 63.8 8 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not 
Reflect Reality 
16.7 43.5 39.8 6.32 3.30 63.2 9 
a15 
Owner Did Not Follow 
Solidarity Conditions 
23.4 43.9 32.7 5.70 3.38 57.0 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10).  
 
Table 18 reflects the descriptive statistics for the contractor-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the contractor’s perspective. The results show 
that item b23 (Delayed Payment to Laborers) ranks first because it recorded the greatest 
FI (85.4), and item b18 (Conflict among Company Partners) ranks last because it 
recorded the lowest FI (37.90). 
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Table 18  
Descriptive Statistics for Contractor-Related Project Delay Causes arranged in 
descending order (Contractor Sample; N = 761) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 9.5 12.2 78.3 8.54 2.93 85.4 1 
b22 Concurrent Projects 7.5 15.9 76.6 8.53 2.81 85.3 2 
b4 Manpower Shortage 11.2 15.6 73.2 8.21 3.13 82.1 3 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project 
Management Skills 
12.1 14.7 73.2 8.18 3.19 81.8 4 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 8.1 22.7 69.1 8.13 2.97 81.3 5 
b21 Contractor Ability 11.2 17.5 71.4 8.12 3.15 81.2 6 
b5 
Inadequate Contractor 
Qualifications 
12.0 38.5 49.5 7.00 3.21 70.0 7 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 12.9 38.5 48.6 6.92 3.25 69.2 8 
b19 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal 17.0 45.2 37.8 6.21 3.27 62.1 9 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 51.4 31.8 16.8 3.79 3.31 37.9 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10). 
  
Table 19 reflects the descriptive statistics for consultant-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the contractor’s perspective. The results show 
that item c24 (Poor Consultant Performance) ranks first because it recorded the greatest 
FI (83.7), and item c9 (Lack of Consultancy Employees) ranks last because it recorded 
the lowest FI (63.70). 
Table 19  
Descriptive Statistics for Consultant-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in 
Descending Order (Contractor Sample; N = 761) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 5.7 22.3 72.0 8.37 2.74 83.7 1 
c25 
Consultant Delayed Project to Extend  
His or Her Contract with Owner 
7.5 22.7 69.8 8.19 2.91 81.9 2 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 16.7 42.6 40.7 6.37 3.32 63.7 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
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Table 20 reflects the descriptive statistics for the other project delay causes in 
Saudi Arabian universities from the contractor’s perspective. The results show that item 
d1 (Bidding System [Low Price]) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (89.1), 
and item d6 (Material Delivery) ranks last because it recorded the lowest FI (59.9). 
 
 Table 20  
Descriptive Statistics for Other Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(Contractor Sample; N = 761) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.9 13.1 82.0 8.91 2.46 89.1 1 
d27 New Worker Regulations 3.8 26.7 69.5 8.32 2.64 83.2 2 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 14.1 34.6 51.4 7.01 3.33 70.1 3 
d6 Material Delivery 25.8 33.9 40.3 5.99 3.64 59.9 4 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 21 reflects the descriptive statistics for overall project delay causes in Saudi 
Arabian universities from the contractor’s perspective. The results show that item a8 
(Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors) ranks first because it recorded the greatest 
FI (95.7), and item b18 (Conflict among Company Partners) ranks last because it 
recorded the lowest FI (37.9). 
The top 10 delay causes were colored in red. The last delay cause (item) was 
almost 82.0% (81.9%). So the study can focus on the top 10 delay causes as major 
causes. 
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Table 21  
Descriptive Statistics for Overall Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(Contractor Sample; N = 761) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
2.8 3.7 93.6 9.57 1.72 95.7 1 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.9 13.1 82.0 8.91 2.46 89.1 2 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 7.4 13.9 78.7 8.64 2.76 86.4 3 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 9.5 12.2 78.3 8.54 2.93 85.4 4 
b22 Concurrent Projects 7.5 15.9 76.6 8.53 2.81 85.3 5 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document Review 
and Approval 
8.3 15.5 76.2 8.48 2.88 84.8 6 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 5.7 22.3 72.0 8.37 2.74 83.7 7 
d27 New Worker Regulations 3.8 26.7 69.5 8.32 2.64 83.2 8 
b4 Manpower Shortage 11.2 15.6 73.2 8.21 3.13 82.1 9 
c25 
Consultant Delayed Project to Extend His 
or Her Contract with Owner 
7.5 22.7 69.8 8.19 2.91 81.9 10 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project Management 
Skills 
12.1 14.7 73.2 8.18 3.19 81.8 11 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 8.1 22.7 69.1 8.13 2.97 81.3 12 
b21 Contractor Ability 11.2 17.5 71.4 8.12 3.15 81.2 13 
a14 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 11.2 21.3 67.5 7.93 3.18 79.3 14 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
12.1 25.0 62.9 7.66 3.25 76.6 15 
a10 Lack of Vision 12.1 36.9 51.0 7.07 3.23 70.7 16 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 14.1 34.6 51.4 7.01 3.33 70.1 17 
b5 Inadequate Contractor Qualifications 12.0 38.5 49.5 7.00 3.21 70.0 18 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 14.8 33.2 51.9 7.00 3.37 70.0 18 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 12.9 38.5 48.6 6.92 3.25 69.2 20 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
17.6 40.7 41.7 6.38 3.37 63.8 21 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 16.7 42.6 40.7 6.37 3.32 63.7 22 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not Reflect 
Reality 
16.7 43.5 39.8 6.32 3.30 63.2 23 
b19 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal 17.0 45.2 37.8 6.21 3.27 62.1 24 
d6 Material Delivery 25.8 33.9 40.3 5.99 3.64 59.9 25 
a15 
Owner  Did Not Follow Solidarity 
Conditions 
23.4 43.9 32.7 5.70 3.38 57.0 26 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 51.4 31.8 16.8 3.79 3.31 37.9 27 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10).  
 
The universities representatives’ sample. Table 22 reflects the descriptive 
statistics for owner-related project delay causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the 
university representative’s perspective. The results show that item a8 (Delay in Progress 
Payments to Contractors) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (86.7), and item 
42 
 
a15 (Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity Conditions) ranks last because it recorded the 
lowest FI (48.4). 
 
Table 22  
Descriptive Statistics for Owner-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending 
Order (University Representatives Sample; N = 43) 
Ca
use 
Co
de 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
7.0 14.0 79.1 8.67 2.75 86.7 1 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 14.0 11.6 74.4 8.16 3.33 81.6 2 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval 
16.3 14.0 69.8 7.84 3.50 78.4 3 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not 
Reflect Reality 
14.0 25.6 60.5 7.47 3.40 74.7 4 
a10 Lack of Vision 14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 5 
a14 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 5 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 5 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 25.6 34.9 39.5 5.95 3.66 59.5 8 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
30.2 44.2 25.6 5.07 3.39 50.7 9 
a15 
Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity 
Conditions 
30.2 48.8 20.9 4.84 3.21 48.4 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 23 reflects the descriptive statistics for contractor-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the university representative’s perspective. The 
results show that item b2 (Poor Contractor Performance) ranks first because it recorded 
the greatest FI (91.2), and item b18 (Conflict among Company Partners) ranks last 
because it recorded the lowest FI (42.8). 
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 Table 23  
Descriptive Statistics for Contractor-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in 
Descending Order (University Representatives Sample; N = 43) 
Cau
se 
Cod
e 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 4.7 9.3 86.0 9.12 2.33 91.2 1 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 4.7 16.3 79.1 8.77 2.54 87.7 2 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project 
Management Skills 
4.7 20.9 74.4 8.53 2.65 85.3 3 
b4 Manpower Shortage 0.0 30.2 69.8 8.49 2.32 84.9 4 
b22 Concurrent Projects 9.3 16.3 74.4 8.35 3.01 83.5 5 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 4.7 25.6 69.8 8.30 2.73 83.0 6 
b19 
Contractor Did Not Study 
Proposal 
9.3 20.9 69.8 8.12 3.07 81.2 7 
b21 Contractor Ability 9.3 25.6 65.1 7.88 3.11 78.8 8 
b5 
Inadequate Contractor 
Qualifications 
9.3 39.5 51.2 7.19 3.12 71.9 9 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 44.2 34.9 20.9 4.28 3.47 42.8 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 24 reflects the descriptive statistics for consultant-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from the university representative’s perspective. The 
results show that item c24 (Poor Consultant Performance) ranks first because it recorded 
the greatest FI (70.5), and item c9 (Lack of Consultancy Employees) ranks last because it 
recorded the lowest FI (43.3). 
 
Table 24  
Descriptive Statistics for Consultant-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in 
Descending Order (University Representatives Sample; N = 43) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 18.6 25.6 55.8 7.05 3.61 70.5 1 
c25 
Consultants Delayed Project to Extend 
His or Her Contract with Owner 
20.9 48.8 30.2 5.67 3.27 56.7 2 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 48.8 25.6 25.6 4.33 3.75 43.3 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
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Table 25 reflects the descriptive statistics for other project delay causes in Saudi 
Arabian universities from the university representative’s perspective. The results show 
that item d1 (Bidding System [Low Price]) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI 
(93.5), and item d27 (New Worker Regulations) ranks last because it recorded the 
minimum FI (53.0). 
 
Table 25  
Descriptive Statistics for Other Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(University Representatives Sample; N = 43) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.7 4.7 90.7 9.35 2.15 93.5 1 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 4.7 30.2 65.1 8.07 2.79 80.7 2 
d6 Material Delivery 25.6 39.5 34.9 5.72 3.55 57.2 3 
d27 New Worker Regulations 18.6 60.5 20.9 5.30 2.88 53.0 4 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 26 reflects the descriptive statistics for overall project delay causes in Saudi 
Arabian universities from the university representative’s perspective. The results show 
that item d1 (Bidding System [Low Price]) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI 
(93.5), and item b18 (Conflict among Company Partners) ranks last because it recorded 
the lowest FI (42.8). 
The top 10 delay causes are indicated in red. The last delay cause (item b19: 
Contractor Did Not Study the Proposal) was 81.2%, so the study can focus on the top 10 
delay causes as major causes. 
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Table 26  
Descriptive Statistics for Overall Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(University Representatives Sample; N = 43) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.7 4.7 90.7 9.35 2.15 93.5 1 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 4.7 9.3 86.0 9.12 2.33 91.2 2 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 4.7 16.3 79.1 8.77 2.54 87.7 3 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
7.0 14.0 79.1 8.67 2.75 86.7 4 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project Management 
Skills 
4.7 20.9 74.4 8.53 2.65 85.3 5 
b4 Manpower Shortage 0.0 30.2 69.8 8.49 2.32 84.9 6 
b22 Concurrent Projects 9.3 16.3 74.4 8.35 3.01 83.5 7 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 4.7 25.6 69.8 8.30 2.73 83.0 8 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 14.0 11.6 74.4 8.16 3.33 81.6 9 
b19 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal 9.3 20.9 69.8 8.12 3.07 81.2 10 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 4.7 30.2 65.1 8.07 2.79 80.7 11 
b21 Contractor Ability 9.3 25.6 65.1 7.88 3.11 78.8 12 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval 
16.3 14.0 69.8 7.84 3.50 78.4 13 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not Reflect 
Reality 
14.0 25.6 60.5 7.47 3.40 74.7 14 
a10 Lack of Vision 14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 15 
a14 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 15 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
14.0 30.2 55.8 7.23 3.39 72.3 15 
b5 Inadequate Contractor Qualifications 9.3 39.5 51.2 7.19 3.12 71.9 18 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 18.6 25.6 55.8 7.05 3.61 70.5 19 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 25.6 34.9 39.5 5.95 3.66 59.5 20 
d6 Material Delivery 25.6 39.5 34.9 5.72 3.55 57.2 21 
c25 
Consultants Delayed Project to Extend 
His or Her Contract with Owner 
20.9 48.8 30.2 5.67 3.27 56.7 22 
d27 New Worker Regulations 18.6 60.5 20.9 5.30 2.88 53.0 23 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
30.2 44.2 25.6 5.07 3.39 50.7 24 
a15 
Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity 
Conditions 
30.2 48.8 20.9 4.84 3.21 48.4 25 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 48.8 25.6 25.6 4.33 3.75 43.3 26 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 44.2 34.9 20.9 4.28 3.47 42.8 27 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
 
The contractors and universities representatives’ sample. Table 27 reflects the 
descriptive statistics for owner-related project delay causes in Saudi Arabian universities 
from both the contractor’s and university representative’s perspectives. The results show 
that item a8 (Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors) ranks first because it recorded 
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the greatest FI (95.2), and item a15 (Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity Conditions) ranks 
last because it recorded the lowest FI (56.5). 
 
Table 27  
Descriptive Statistics for Owner-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending 
Order (Combined Sample; N = 804) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
3.0 4.2 92.8 9.52 1.80 95.2 1 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 7.7 13.8 78.5 8.62 2.79 86.2 2 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval 
8.7 15.4 75.9 8.45 2.92 84.5 3 
a14 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 11. 21.8 66.9 7.89 3.19 78.9 4 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
12.2 25.2 62.6 7.64 3.26 76.4 5 
a10 Lack of Vision 12.2 36.6 51.2 7.07 3.24 70.7 6 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 15.4 33.3 51.2 6.95 3.39 69.5 7 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
18.3 40.9 40.8 6.31 3.38 63.1 8 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not 
Reflect Reality 
16.5 42.5 40.9 6.38 3.31 63.8 9 
a15 
Owner  Did Not Follow Solidarity 
Conditions 
23.8 44.2 32.1 5.65 3.38 56.5 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
 
Table 28 reflects the descriptive statistics for contractor-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from both the contractor’s and university 
representative’s perspectives. The results show that item b23 (Delayed Payment to 
Laborers) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (85.5), and item b18 (Conflict 
among Company Partners) ranks last because it recorded the lowest FI (38.1). 
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 Table 28  
Descriptive Statistics for Contractor-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in 
Descending Order (Combined Sample; N = 804) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 9.2 12.4 78.4 8.55 2.91 85.5 1 
b22 Concurrent Projects 7.6 15.9 76.5 8.52 2.82 85.2 2 
b4 Manpower Shortage 10.6 16.4 73.0 8.23 3.09 82.3 3 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project 
Management Skills 
11.7 15.0 73.3 8.20 3.16 82.0 4 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 8.0 22.2 70.0 8.18 2.94 81.8 5 
b21 Contractors Ability 11.1 17.9 71.0 8.11 3.14 81.1 6 
b5 Inadequate Contractor Qualifications 11.8 38.6 49.6 7.01 3.21 70.1 7 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 12.4 37.8 49.8 6.99 3.24 69.9 8 
b19 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal 16.5 43.9 39.6 6.32 3.29 63.2 9 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 51.0 32.0 17.0 3.81 3.32 38.1 10 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 29 reflects the descriptive statistics for consultant-related project delay 
causes in Saudi Arabian universities from both the contractor’s and university 
representative’s perspectives. The results show that item c24 (Poor Consultant 
Performance) ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (83.0), and item c9 (Lack of 
Consultancy Employees) ranks last because it recorded the lowest FI (62.6). 
 
 Table 29 
Descriptive Statistics for Consultant-Related Project Delay Causes Arranged in 
Descending Order (Combined Sample; N = 804) 
Cause 
code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
common 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 6.3 22.5 71.1 8.30 2.81 83.0 1 
c25 
Consultants Delayed Project to Extend 
His or Her Contract with Owner 
8.2 24.1 67.7 8.05 2.98 80.5 2 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 18.4 41.7 39.9 6.26 3.37 62.6 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
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Table 30 reflects the descriptive statistics for other project delay in Saudi Arabian 
universities from both the contractor’s and university representative’s perspectives. The 
results show that item d1 (Bidding System [Low Price]) ranks first because it recorded 
the greatest FI (89.3), and item d6 (Lack of Consultancy Employees) ranks last because it 
recorded the lowest FI (59.7). 
 
Table 30  
Descriptive Statistics for Other Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(Combined Sample; N = 804) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.9 12.7 82.5 8.93 2.44 89.3 1 
d27 New Worker Regulations 4.6 28.5 66.9 8.16 2.73 81.6 2 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 13.6 34.3 52.1 7.06 3.31 70.6 3 
d6 Material Delivery 25.7 34.2 40.0 5.97 3.63 59.7 4 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
 
Table 31 reflects the descriptive statistics for overall project delay causes in Saudi 
Arabian universities from both the contractor’s and university representative’s 
perspectives. The results show that item a8 (Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors) 
ranks first because it recorded the greatest FI (95.2), and item b18 (Conflict among 
Company Partners) ranks last because it recorded the lowest FI (38.1). 
The top 10 delay causes are indicated in red. The last project delay cause (item 
b2; Poor Contractor Performance) was (81.8%), so the study can focus on the top 10 
project delay causes as major causes. 
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Table 31  
Descriptive Statistics for Overall Project Delay Causes Arranged in Descending Order 
(Combined Sample; N = 804) 
Cause 
Code 
Delay Cause 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order 
Not 
Common 
(1) 
Don’t 
Know 
(5) 
 
Common 
(10) 
 
a8 
Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
3.0 4.2 92.8 9.52 1.80 95.2 1 
d1 Bidding System (Low Price) 4.9 12.7 82.5 8.93 2.44 89.3 2 
a13 Lack of Project Budget 7.7 13.8 78.5 8.62 2.79 86.2 3 
b23 Delayed Payment to Laborers 9.2 12.4 78.4 8.55 2.91 85.5 4 
b22 Concurrent Projects 7.6 15.9 76.5 8.52 2.82 85.2 5 
a7 
Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval 
8.7 15.4 75.9 8.45 2.92 84.5 6 
c24 Poor Consultant Performance 6.3 22.5 71.1 8.30 2.81 83.0 7 
b4 Manpower Shortage 10.6 16.4 73.0 8.23 3.09 82.3 8 
b20 
Contactor Lacked Project 
Management Skills 
11.7 15.0 73.3 8.20 3.16 82.0 9 
b2 Poor Contractor Performance 8.0 22.2 70.0 8.18 2.94 81.8 10 
d27 New Worker Regulations 4.6 28.5 66.9 8.16 2.73 81.6 11 
b21 Contractor Ability 11.1 17.9 71.0 8.11 3.14 81.1 12 
c25 
Consultants Delayed Project to Extend 
His or Her Contract with Owner 
8.2 24.1 67.7 8.05 2.98 80.5 13 
a14 Owner’s Wrong Decision Making 11. 21.8 66.9 7.89 3.19 78.9 14 
a16 
Inadequate Project Management 
Department 
12.2 25.2 62.6 7.64 3.26 76.4 15 
a10 Lack of Vision 12.2 36.6 51.2 7.07 3.24 70.7 16 
d26 Unclear Procurement System 13.6 34.3 52.1 7.06 3.31 70.6 17 
b5 Inadequate Contractor Qualifications 11.8 38.6 49.6 7.01 3.21 70.1 18 
b3 Lack of Experienced Contractors 12.4 37.8 49.8 6.99 3.24 69.9 19 
a12 Owner Controlled Designer 15.4 33.3 51.2 6.95 3.39 69.5 20 
a11 
Design Requirements Do Not Reflect 
Reality 
16.5 42.5 40.9 6.38 3.31 63.8 21 
b19 Contractor Did Not Study Proposal 16.5 43.9 39.6 6.32 3.29 63.2 22 
a17 
Changing Consultant During 
Implementation 
18.3 40.9 40.8 6.31 3.38 63.1 23 
c9 Lack of Consultancy Employees 18.4 41.7 39.9 6.26 3.37 62.6 24 
d6 Material Delivery 25.7 34.2 40.0 5.97 3.63 59.7 25 
a15 
Owner  Did Not Follow Solidarity 
Conditions  
23.8 44.2 32.1 5.65 3.38 56.5 26 
b18 Conflict among Company Partners 51.0 32.0 17.0 3.81 3.32 38.1 27 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10)  
 
Causes of Cost Overrun 
Validity 
The construct validity was used to assess the validity of the items of the cost 
overrun causes the project in Saudi Arabian universities.  The correlation values shown in 
table 32 reflect a very strong relationship between each item of the cost overrun and the 
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total of the items, suggesting very satisfactory construct validity. All the values were 
statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Note that most of the values provided in 
the table were close to the integer 1, which represents the maximum possible value a 
relationship may reach. The minimum correlation (but considered to express high 
correlation) value was observed between item no. 1 (Change Orders) and the cost overrun 
(0.841). A value of 0.70 or higher is considered to express a strong relationship.  
 
Table 32 
The Construct Validity for the Cost Overrun Causes (All Sample N=804) 
Item no. Cost overrun causes Over all causes 
1 Change Orders 0.841 
2 Bid Proposal Errors 0.888 
3 Contractor’s Errors 0.884 
4 Consultant’s Errors 0.911 
5 Client’s Change of Scope 0.890 
6 Dividing Bids into Several Parts 0.949 
7 Unforeseen Risks 0.948 
 
Reliability 
The approach of internal consistency for Cronbach’s alpha was used to describe 
how much the items of the cost overrun are reliable to measure these causes. The value of 
the internal consistency provided in table 33 suggests strong reliability. A value of 0.60 or 
greater expresses good reliability, so the provided values express a high degree of 
consistency. 
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Table 33 
Reliability Analysis Using Cronbach’s Alpha the Cost Overrun Causes (Overall Sample 
N=804) 
 No. of items value 
Cost overrun causes 7 0.960 
 
Prioritizing Causes of Cost Overruns 
The mean, standard deviation, and frequency index formulas were used to 
calculate the included statistical indices. The results are presented in three levels; 
contractors, universities’ representatives, and the overall results of contractors and 
universities’ representatives. 
 
The contractors’ sample. Table 34 reflects the descriptive statistics for the cost 
overrun causes for Saudi Arabian university projects from the contractor’s perspective. 
The results show that item no. 1 (Change Orders) is ranked first as it recorded the greatest 
FI (88.6), while item no. 3 (Contractor’s Errors) is ranked last as it recorded the lowest FI 
(58.6). All other values ranged between these two values. It is noted that the top three 
cost overrun causes had a score above 80.0 FI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Table 34 
Descriptive Statistics for the Causes of Cost Overruns According to Contractors 
Arranged in Descending Order (Contractor’s Sample N=761) 
Cause 
code 
Item  Frequency % 
mean SD FI* order 
Not 
common 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
1 Change Orders 5.5 12.9 81.6 8.86 2.53 88.6 1 
2 Bid Proposal Errors 8.3 12.9 78.8 8.61 2.83 86.1 2 
5 Client’s Change of Scope 6.6 15.9 77.5 8.61 2.72 86.1 2 
4 Consultant’s Errors 10.1 41.8 48.1 7.00 3.11 70.0 4 
7 Unforeseen Risks 14.7 34.8 50.5 6.93 3.35 69.3 5 
6 Dividing Bids into Several Parts 14.7 35.7 49.5 6.89 3.34 68.9 6 
3 Contractor’s Errors 24.4 38.9 36.7 5.86 3.52 58.6 7 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
The universities representatives’ sample. Table 35 reflects the descriptive 
statistics for the cost overrun causes for Saudi Arabian university projects from the 
perspective of university representatives. The results show that item no. 1 (Change 
Orders) is ranked first as it recorded the greatest FI (97.7), while item no. 4 (Consultant’s 
Errors) is ranked last as it recorded the lowest FI (54.0). All other values ranged between 
these two values. It is noted that the top three cost overrun causes had a score above 
80.0FI. 
 Table 35 
Descriptive Statistics for the Causes of Cost Overruns According to Representatives of 
Universities Arranged in Descending Order (University Representatives N=43) 
Cause 
code 
Item  Frequency % 
mean SD FI* order 
Not 
common 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
1 Change Orders 0.0 4.7 95.3 9.77 1.07 97.7 1 
5 Client’s Change of Scope 4.7 18.6 76.7 8.65 2.60 86.5 2 
2 Bid Proposal Errors 14.0 9.3 76.7 8.28 3.30 82.8 3 
3 Contractor’s Errors 14.0 34.9 51.2 7.00 3.36 70.0 4 
6 Dividing Bids into Several Parts 18.6 30.2 51.2 6.81 3.57 68.1 5 
7 Unforeseen Risks 18.6 30.2 51.2 6.81 3.57 68.1 5 
4 Consultant’s Errors 27.9 41.9 30.2 5.40 3.49 54.0 7 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
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The contractors and universities representatives’ sample. Table 36 reflects the 
descriptive statistics for the cost overrun causes for Saudi Arabian university projects 
from both the perspectives of the contractors and university representatives. The results 
show that item no. 1 (Change Orders) is ranked first as it recorded the greatest FI (89.1) 
while item no. 3 (Contractor’s Errors) is ranked last as it recorded the lowest FI (59.2). 
All other values ranged between these two values. 
 
Table 36  
Descriptive Statistics for the Causes of Cost Overruns According to Contractors and 
Representatives of Universities Arranged in Descending Order (Contractors And 
University Representatives N=804) 
Cause 
code 
Item  
Frequency % 
mean SD FI* order 
Not 
common 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Common 
(10) 
1 Change Orders 5.2 12.4 82.3 8.91 2.48 89.1 1 
5 Client’s Change of Scope 6.5 16.0 77.5 8.62 2.71 86.2 2 
2 Bid Proposal Errors 8.6 12.7 78.7 8.59 2.86 85.9 3 
7 Unforeseen Risks 14.9 34.6 50.5 6.93 3.36 69.3 4 
4 Consultant’s Errors 11.1 41.8 47.1 6.91 3.15 69.1 5 
6 Dividing Bids into Several Parts 14.9 35.4 49.6 6.88 3.36 68.8 6 
3 Contractor’s Errors 23.9 38.7 37.4 5.92 3.52 59.2 7 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Current Procurement System and Proposed Model Using BV PIPS 
Validity 
Construct validity was used to assess the validity of the items of the current 
procurement system, best value principles, and the new (proposed) procurement systems 
in Saudi Arabia. The Pearson’s correlation was used to evaluate the relationship between 
each item and the total representing all the items. The correlation values mentioned in 
54 
 
Table 37 reflect a strong relationship between each item and the dimension to which it 
belongs, suggesting a highly satisfactory construct validity. All the values were 
statistically significant at 0.05, 0.01 levels. Note that most of the values provided in the 
table were close to the integer 1, which represents the maximum possible value a 
relationship may reach. The minimum correlation values were observed between item 12 
and the proposed procurement system (0.860) and between item 1 and the total of items 
in part 1 (0.559). This value expresses a moderate relationship. Generally a value of 0.70 
or higher is considered to express a strong relationship.  
 
Table 37 
The Construct Validity for the Current Procurement System, Best Value Principles, and 
New (Proposed) Procurement Systems (N = 804) 
Item no. 
Current Procurement 
System 
Best Value Principles 
New Proposed 
Procurement System 
Overall 
1 0.950   0.559 
2 0.898   0.860 
3  0.980  0.917 
4  0.973  0.928 
5  0.960  0.887 
6   0.983 0.947 
7   0.977 0.939 
8   0.962 0.945 
9   0.979 0.949 
10   0.980 0.945 
11   0.971 0.929 
12   0.860 0.851 
13   0.962 0.931 
 
Reliability 
The internal consistency approach for Cronbach’s alpha was used to describe how 
much the items pertaining to each dimension of the current and new (proposed) 
procurement systems are reliable in measuring these procurement systems. The values of 
the internal consistency provided in Table 38 suggest a very meaningful reliability. 
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Generally a value of 0.60 or greater expresses a strong reliability so the provided values 
express a high degree of consistency and, consequently, good reliability. (Here also the 
maximum possible value that may be obtained is 1.)  
 
Table 38 
Reliability Analysis Using Cronbach’s Alpha for the Current Procurement Systems, BV, 
and the New (Proposed) Procurement Systems (N = 804) 
Dimensions No. of items Value 
Current Procurement System 2 0.806 
Best Value Principles 3 0.960 
New Proposed Procurement System 8 0.987 
Overall 13 0.967 
 
Rating Procurement System 
The mean, standard deviation, and frequency index formulas were used to 
calculate the included statistical indices. The results are presented in three levels; 
contractors, universities’ representatives, and the overall results of contractors and 
universities’ representatives. 
 
The contractors’ sample. Table 39 reflects the descriptive statistics for the 
current procurement system in projects in Saudi Arabia. The results show that item A1 (I 
have high satisfaction with the current procurement system) was ranked first in order 
because it received the greatest FI (38.0), whereas item A2 (Do you think selecting 
contractors solely based on price is the optimal practice for procuring services?) was 
ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (18.80). All these results suggest 
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that the classified contractors have a weak opinion of the current procurement system 
(Low-bid). 
 
Table 39 
Descriptive Statistics for the Current Procurement System in Projects in Saudi Arabia 
Arranged in Descending Order (Contractors Sample N = 761) 
Item 
code 
Current Procurement System 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree  
(10) 
A1 
I have high satisfaction with the current 
procurement system 
45.9 41.4 12.7 3.80 3.02 38.00 1 
A2 
Do you think selecting contractors solely 
based on price is the optimal practice for 
procuring services? 
83.7 11.8 4.5 1.88 2.18 18.80 2 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 40 shows the descriptive statistics for the best value principles to be used in 
Saudi Arabia. The results show that item B3 (I would you be interested in learning more 
about a new procurement model that may improve the current procurement system by 
identifying and utilizing expertise) was ranked first in order because it recorded the 
greatest FI (94.30), whereas item B2 (Would you support improvements to the current 
procurement system that selects contractors based on performance with price?) was 
ranked  last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (90.70). All other values ranged 
between these two values. These values suggest that the classified contractors ranked best 
value as an important outcome. 
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Table 40 
Descriptive Statistics for the Best Value Principles to Be Used in Saudi Arabia Arranged 
in Descending Order (Contractors Sample N = 761) 
Item 
code 
Best Value Principles 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
B3 
I would you be interested in learning more 
about a new procurement model that may 
improve the current procurement system by 
identifying and utilizing expertise. 
1.8 8.0 90.1 9.43 1.78 94.30 1 
B1 
Do you think selecting contractors based on 
performance with price would be more 
optimal? 
5.1 5.8 89.1 9.25 2.25 92.50 2 
B2 
Would you support improvements to the 
current procurement system that selects 
contractors based on performance with price? 
7.2 5.5 87.3 9.07 2.53 90.70 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 41 outlines the descriptive statistics for the new (proposed) procurement 
system in Saudi Arabia. The results show that item C7 (Would it be beneficial if the 
government documented all performance on projects and posted the performance for all 
contractors to compare?) was ranked first in order because it recorded the greatest FI 
(94.30), whereas item C4 (During the clarification period, would interviewing the 
selected contractor’s project manager performing the work improve the procurement 
process?) was ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (88.30). All other 
values ranged between these two values and suggest the classified contractors have a high 
opinion of the proposed procurement system 
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Table 41 
Descriptive Statistics for the New (Proposed) Procurement System for Saudi Arabia 
Arranged in Descending Order (Contractors Sample N = 761) 
Item 
code 
New Proposed Procurement System 
Frequency % 
mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
C7 
Would it be beneficial if the government 
documented all performance on projects and 
posted the performance for all contractors to 
compare? 
2.8 6.4 90.8 9.43 1.88 94.30 1 
C8 
Would these new procurement process 
improvements help to identify expertise and 
utilize it to improve the overall performance on 
projects? 
3.5 10.9 85.5 9.14 2.20 91.40 2 
C6 
During the execution of a project, would 
project performance increase if contractors 
measured their performance (time, cost, 
quality) weekly and submitted it to the client? 
3.5 12.6 83.8 9.05 2.27 90.50 3 
C3 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
asking contractors to propose ways they can 
add value to a project in their proposal 
improve the procurement process? 
7.2 6.4 86.3 9.03 2.55 90.30 4 
C5 
During the clarification period, would 
requiring the selected contractor to provide a 
project plan from beginning to end, including 
scope of work, technical and milestone 
schedule, major risks that fall outside of that 
scope before they receive a contract, and how 
they will measure their performance, improve 
the procurement process? 
5.5 10.6 83.8 8.97 2.47 89.70 5 
C2 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit potential risks 
they foresee on the project and state how they 
will mitigate and manage them improve the 
procurement process? 
5.4 11.4 83.2 8.94 2.47 89.40 6 
C1 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit verifiable 
performance information improve the 
procurement process? 
6.3 10.0 83.7 8.93 2.54 89.30 7 
C4 
During the clarification period, would 
interviewing the selected contractor’s project 
manager performing the work improve the 
procurement process? 
9.1 7.1 83.8 8.83 2.79 88.30 8 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
The universities representatives’ sample. Table 42 outlines the descriptive 
statistics for the current procurement system in Saudi Arabia. The results show that item 
A1 (I have high satisfaction with the current procurement system) was ranked the first 
order because it recorded the greatest FI (28.10), whereas item A2 (Do you think 
selecting contractors solely based on price is the optimal practice for procuring services?) 
59 
 
was ranked the last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (11.90). These values 
suggest the universities’ representatives have a low opinion of the current procurement 
system. 
 
Table 42 
Descriptive Statistics for the Current Procurement System in Saudi Arabia Arranged in 
Descending Order (Universities’ Representatives Sample N = 43) 
Item 
code 
Current Procurement System 
Frequency % 
mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
A1 
I have high satisfaction with the current 
procurement system 
60.5 34.9 4.7 2.81 2.49 28.10 1 
A2 
Do you think selecting contractors solely 
based on price is the optimal practice for 
procuring services? 
95.3 4.7 0.0 1.19 0.85 11.90 2 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 43 reflects the descriptive statistics for the best value principles to be used 
in Saudi Arabia. The results show that item B2 (Would you support improvements to the 
current procurement system that selects contractors based on performance with price?) 
was ranked first in order because it recorded the greatest FI (100.0), whereas item B1 (Do 
you think selecting contractors based on performance with price would be more optimal?) 
was ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (95.30). These values 
suggest the universities’ representatives have a positive opinion of BV PIPS. 
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Table 43 
Descriptive Statistics for the Best Value Principles to Be Used in Saudi Arabia Arranged 
in Descending Order (Universities’ Representatives Sample N = 43) 
Item 
code 
Best Value Principles 
Frequency % 
mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
B2 
Would you support improvements to the 
current procurement system that selects 
contractors based on performance with price? 
0.0 0.0 100.0 10.00 0.00 100.00 1 
B3 
I would you be interested in learning more 
about a new procurement model that may 
improve the current procurement system by 
identifying and utilizing expertise.  
0.0 4.7 95.3 9.77 1.07 97.70 2 
B1 
Do you think selecting contractors based on 
performance with price would be more 
optimal? 
0.0 9.3 90.7 9.53 1.47 95.30 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 44 sketches the descriptive statistics for the new (proposed) procurement 
system for Saudi Arabia. The results show that item C5 (During the clarification period, 
would requiring the selected contractor to provide a project plan from beginning to end, 
including scope of work, technical and milestone schedule, major risks that fall outside of 
that scope before they receive a contract, and how they will measure their performance, 
improve the procurement process?) was ranked first in order because it recorded the 
greatest FI (97.70), whereas item C7 (Would it be beneficial if the government 
documented all performances on projects and posted a performance for all contractors to 
compare?) was ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (87.40). All other 
values range between these two values and suggest the universities’ representatives have 
a high opinion of the proposed procurement system. 
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Table 44  
Descriptive Statistics for the New (Proposed) Procurement System for Saudi Arabia 
Arranged in Descending Order (Universities’ Representatives Sample N = 43) 
Item 
code 
New Proposed Procurement System 
Frequency % 
mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
C5 
During the clarification period, would 
requiring the selected contractor to provide a 
project plan from beginning to end, including 
scope of work, technical and milestone 
schedule, major risks that fall outside of that 
scope before they receive a contract, and how 
they will measure their performance, improve 
the procurement process? 
0.0 4.7 95.3 9.77 1.07 97.70 1 
C6 
During the execution of a project, would 
project performance increase if contractors 
measured their performance (time, cost, 
quality) weekly and submitted this to the 
client? 
4.7 0.0 95.3 9.58 1.92 95.80 2 
C8 
Would these new procurement process 
improvements help to identify expertise and 
utilize it to improve the overall performance 
on projects? 
4.7 0.0 95.3 9.58 1.92 95.80 2 
C3 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
asking contractors to propose ways they can 
add value to a project in their proposal 
improve the procurement process? 
4.7 4.7 90.7 9.40 1.97 94.00 4 
C1 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit verifiable 
performance information improve the 
procurement process? 
0.0 16.3 83.7 9.19 1.87 91.90 5 
C4 
During the clarification period, would 
interviewing the selected contractor’s project 
manager performing the work improve the 
procurement process? 
0.0 16.3 83.7 9.19 1.87 91.90 5 
C2 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit potential risks 
they foresee on the project and state how they 
would mitigate and manage them improve the 
procurement process? 
4.7 11.6 83.7 9.00 2.41 90.00 7 
C7 
Would it be beneficial if the government 
documented all performance on projects and 
posted the performance for all contractors to 
compare? 
14.0 0.0 86.0 8.74 3.16 87.40 8 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
The contractors and universities representatives’ sample. Table 45 outlines the 
descriptive statistics for the current procurement system in Saudi Arabia. The results 
show that item A1 (I have high satisfaction with the current procurement system) was 
ranked  first in order because it recorded the greatest FI (37.5), whereas item A2 (Do you 
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think selecting contractors solely based on price is the optimal practice for procuring 
services?) was ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (18.40). These 
values suggest both the classified contractors and universities’ representatives have a low 
opinion concerning the current procurement system. 
 
Table 45  
Descriptive Statistics for the Current Procurement System in Saudi Arabia Arranged in 
Descending Order (Sample N = 804) 
Item 
code 
Current Procurement System 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
A1 
I have high satisfaction with the current 
procurement system 
46.6 41.0 12.3 3.75 3.00 37.50 1 
A2 
Do you think selecting contractors solely based 
on price is the optimal practice for procuring 
services? 
84.3 11.4 4.2 1.84 2.14 18.40 2 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 46 outlines the descriptive statistics for the best value principles to be used 
in Saudi Arabia. The results show that item B3 (I would you be interested in learning 
more about a new procurement model that may improve the current procurement system 
by identifying and utilizing expertise) was ranked first in order because it recorded the 
greatest FI (94.50), whereas item B2 (Would you support improvements to the current 
procurement system that selects contractors based on performance with price?) was 
ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (91.20). These results suggest 
that both classified contractors and universities’ representatives have a high opinion 
regarding BV PIPS. 
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Table 46  
Descriptive Statistics for the Best Value Principles to Be Used in Saudi Arabia Arranged 
in Descending Order (Sample N = 804) 
Item 
code 
Best Value Principles 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
B3 
I would you be interested in learning more 
about a new procurement model that may 
improve the current procurement system by 
identifying and utilizing expertise. 
1.7 7.8 90.4 9.45 1.75 94.50 1 
B1 
Do you think selecting contractors based 
on performance with price would be more 
optimal? 
4.9 6.0 89.2 9.26 2.21 92.60 2 
B2 
Would you support improvements to the 
current procurement system that select 
contractors based on performance with 
price? 
6.8 5.2 87.9 9.12 2.47 91.20 3 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
 
Table 47 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the new (proposed) procurement 
system for Saudi Arabia. The results show that item C7 (Would it be beneficial if the 
government documented all performance on projects and posted the performance for all 
contractors to compare?) was ranked first in order because it recorded the greatest FI 
(93.90), whereas item C4 (During the clarification period, would interviewing the 
selected contractor’s project manager performing the work improve the procurement 
process?) was ranked last in order because it recorded the minimum FI (88.50). All other 
values ranged between these two values, which suggest that both classified contractors 
and universities’ representatives have a high opinion of the proposed procurement 
system. 
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Table 47  
Descriptive Statistics for the New (Proposed) Procurement System for Saudi Arabia 
Arranged in Descending Order (Sample N = 804) 
Item 
code 
New Proposed Procurement System 
Frequency % 
Mean SD FI* Order Disagree 
(1) 
Don’t 
know 
(5) 
Agree 
(10) 
C7 
Would it be beneficial if the government 
documented all performance on projects and 
posted the performance for all contractors to 
compare? 
3.4 6.1 90.5 9.39 1.97 93.90 1 
C8 
Would these new procurement process 
improvements help to identify expertise and 
utilize it to improve the overall performance on 
projects? 
3.6 10.3 86.1 9.16 2.19 91.60 2 
C6 
During the execution of a project, would project 
performance increase if contractors measured 
their performance (time, cost, quality) weekly 
and submitted to the client? 
3.6 11.9 84.5 9.08 2.25 90.80 3 
C3 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
asking contractors to propose ways they can add 
value to a project in their proposal improve the 
procurement process? 
7.1 6.3 86.6 9.05 2.53 90.50 4 
C5 
During the clarification period, would requiring 
the selected contractor to provide a project plan 
from beginning to end, including scope of work, 
technical and milestone schedule, major risks 
that fall outside of that scope before they 
receive a contract, and how they will measure 
their performance, improve the procurement 
process? 
5.2 10.3 84.5 9.01 2.42 90.10 5 
C1 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit verifiable 
performance information improve the 
procurement process? 
6.0 10.3 83.7 8.95 2.51 89.50 6 
C2 
In addition to only evaluating price, would 
requiring contractors to submit potential risks 
they foresee on the project and state how they 
will mitigate and manage them improve the 
procurement process? 
5.3 11.4 83.2 8.95 2.47 89.50 6 
C4 
During the clarification period, would 
interviewing the selected contractor’s project 
manager performing the work improve the 
procurement process? 
8.6 7.6 83.8 8.85 2.74 88.50 8 
(*) mean percentage out of the maximum weight (10) 
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 CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
Causes of Delay Factors 
The previous study found 27 important factors that delayed public projects in 
Saudi Arabia. An interview was conducted with owners of the university, and that 
interview revealed 27 delay factors that delayed projects at the university. Thses 27 delay 
factors rated via survey which included 761 classified contractors and 43 universities’ 
representatives. When the university delay factors were compared with important delay 
factors in Saudi Arabia and top 10 rated by survey, it was found that 14 most common 
delay factors, as shown in Figure 9. The 14 delay factors can be solved via BV PIPS. This 
analysis shows that BV PIPS can deal with these delay factors, as shown in Table 48. 
Figure 9  
Comparison of The University’s Delay Factors with Most Important Delay Factors in 
Literature Review and The Survey 
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Table 48 
How BV PIPS Can Solve Important Delay Factors in Saudi Arabia 
Important Risk Factor  
Rating 
Average by 
survey sample 
n = 804 
Important 
in previous 
studies 
(PIPS) 
Where Risk 
is 
Addressed 
Justification 
1- Delay in Progress Payments to 
Contractors 
9.52 √ 
BV ,S, C, 
and E 
Creating BV environment, 
risk assessment 
2- Bidding System (Low Price) 8.93 √ 
BV , P-Q, S, 
C, and E 
PIPS based on performance 
3- Lack of Project Budget 8.62 
 
BV and C Creating BV environment 
4- Delayed Payment to Laborers 8.55 
 
C risk assessment  
5- Concurrent Projects 8.52 
 
S, C, and E 
Level of experience, 
interview, risk assessment  
6-Owner’s Late Design Document 
Review and Approval 
8.45 √ BV ,and C 
Creating best value (BV) 
environment.  
7- Poor Consultant Performance 8.30 
 
BV ,S, and 
C 
Experience of vender  
mitigate that factor 
8- Manpower Shortage 8.23 √ 
BV , P-Q, C, 
and E 
Risk assessment,  
9- Contactor Lacked Project 
Management Skills 
8.20 
 
S, C, and E 
Level of experience, 
interview, risk assessment. 
10- Poor Contractor Performance 8.18 √ 
P-Q, S, C, 
and E 
Level of experience, 
interview, risk assessment. 
11- Lack experience of 
contractors 
6.99 √ 
BV , P-Q, S, 
C, and E 
Level of experience, 
interview, risk assessment. 
12- Inadequate Contractor 
Qualifications  
7.01 √ 
BV , P-Q, S, 
and  C 
Qualification vender, level of 
experience. 
13- Material delivery  5.97 √ S, C, and E 
Risk assessment, show plan 
B  
14- Lack of consultancy 
employees 
6.26 √ 
BV ,S, and 
C 
Experience of vender  
mitigate that factor 
Key :  BV: Best Value environment    P-Q: Pre-qualification.    S: selection.       C: clarification.         E: execution.  
 
Best Value depends on penalty principles related to common sense. Best Value 
decreases management, decision-making, and control by utilizing expertise and 
increasing transparency. These principles assist owners in utilizing expert opinion to 
increase the approval rate of design documents. When an organization increases 
transparency and decreases control, the organization’s progress increases, which solves 
many factors related to owner. Bidding system in Saudi Arabia based on lowest price. 
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This can be solved by changing the bidding system to BV PIPS, which uses many phases 
to select the highest-performing vendor who is the best value. BV PIPS is a procurement 
system that relies on performance to find the best value vendor, contrary to the current 
bid system in Saudi Arabia that relies on lowest price. The pre-qualification phase that 
informs vendors about Best Value and shows them that BV PIPS relies on performance 
and how they must check their level of performance through numbers and matrices. The 
selection phase has many filters that determine the level of vendor experience. Also in 
this filter, vendors should submit risk-assessment documents which include delay factors 
that show the vendors’ capability to see risks that could affect projects and how the 
vendor can mitigate risks. Expert vendors can see this problem and provide a plan B if 
necessary.  Moreover, the interview with the people who will do the work—or the project 
manager—will show if vendors have poor performance or lack experience. The interview 
assists owner to recognize if contractors have clear vision of projects. The clarification 
phase is considered as important phase.  A vendor who has already been selected clarifies 
their offerings and planning process. The vendor should identify the scope of the work 
and submit a detailed technical schedule and a milestone schedule. That will show if the 
vendor can complete the work. BV PIPS helps the owner to find an expert vendor who 
has a high performance level and can complete works that already prove his or her 
abilities during the selection phase. So, expert vendors do the work well, which reduces 
the need for consultancy employees. 
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Causes of Cost Overrun 
According to the survey, it is found that Change Orders, Client’s Change of 
Scope, and Bid Proposal Errors are the most important causes of cost overruns in Saudi 
Arabia. Conversely, BVA and PIPS display a high level of construction performance with 
100% of such projects staying within budget and being completed on time with 0% 
change orders. PIPS has demonstrated ability to locate expert contractors with the high 
performance and the lowest price. During the clarification phase, an expert contractor 
will clarify and consider all risks and change orders that could happen during the 
execution phase and lead to cost deviation. 
 
Current Procurement System and Proposed Model Using BV PIPS 
The survey showed that classified contractors and universities’ representatives are 
unsatisfied with the current (low-bid) procurement system. In addition, it showed 
contractors and universities’ representatives had a high level of agreement over accepting 
best value principles and selecting contactors based on performance with price. In 
addition, contractors and universities’ representatives agreed about the benefits of 
submitting LE, RA, and VA documents in the elevation phase. Moreover, in the 
clarification phase, they agreed on interviewing the PM and submitting the project’s 
scope, technical schedule, milestone schedule, and risk management plan. They also 
agreed on submitting a WRR and DR during the execution phase and to document them. 
Figures 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 outline the survey results of classified 
contractors and universities’ representatives’ opinions regarding improving the current 
procurement system. 
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Figure 10 
The Bar Chart Shows Satisfaction with the Low-Bid System 
  
 
Figure 11 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Selecting Contactors Based on Performance with 
Price 
 
 
Figure 12 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Submitting Level of Experience (LE) Reports 
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Figure 13 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Submitting Risk Assessments (RA) During the 
Proposal Evaluation Phase 
 
Figure 14 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Submitting Value Added (VA) Reports During 
Proposal Evaluations. 
 
Figure 15 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Whether a Project Manager Should Be 
Interviewed During the Clarification Phase 
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Figure 16 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Submitting the Project’s Scope, Technical 
Schedule, Milestone Schedule, and Risk Management Plan During the Clarification 
Phase 
 
Figure 17 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Submitting a Weekly Risk Report (WRR) and 
Director’s Report (DR) During the Execution Phase 
 
Figure 18 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Documenting the Contractor’s Performance 
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Figure 19 
The Bar Chart Shows Agreement over Whether the New Procurement Processes Improve 
Overall Performance on Projects 
 
The proposed procurement system using BV PIPS in Saudi Arabia utilizes the 
following process:  
  
 The first phase involves the request for proposal (RFP).  
 In the second phase, bids are announced in local newspapers and on Web sites.  
 In the third phase, owners receive the proposals and check them to match 
instructions.  
 When the committee and time frame are identified for the opening of sealed bids, 
the fourth phase is ready for financial analysis and is prioritized by lowest price.  
 In the fifth and sixth phase, the committee evaluates the level of experience (LE), 
risk assessment (RA), and value added (VA) documents—each of the three 
documents should be two pages, maximum. Bidders with low performance should 
be eliminated, and the committee should select the lowest bidder price among 
those contractors who have acceptable performance. Committees should use the 
numbers 1–10 or percentages to weight the three documents and then review all 
documents of the selected bidder. If the committee finds anything that conflicts 
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with the LE, RS, or VA documents, the committee should eliminate the bidder and 
select the next one.  
 If accepted, the lowest bidder moves to the negotiation phase with the committee. 
In the seventh phase, the committee should interview the project manager for 15 
minutes about the project to see if the project manager is an expert. Also, the 
bidder should submit the project’s scope, technical schedule, milestone schedule, 
and risk management plan. Based on these requirements, the committee should be 
able to see if the bidder is an expert. If the bidder and committee are not able to 
find common ground, the committee should then select another bidder. 
 After signing the contract with the vendor, bidder move to the eighth phase, which 
is the project awarding procedure.  
 In the ninth phase, the vendor moves to the execution phase. Here, the vendor 
should submit a weekly risk report (WRR) and director’s report (DR) to document 
the contractor’s performance to the client, the Contractors’ Classification Agency, 
and the National Information Center. These documents assist in increasing 
transparency among project parties, which will increase the success of the project.  
 
The summary of the proposed procurement system using VB PIPS is shown in 
Figure 20. 
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Figure 20 
Proposed Procurement System Using BV PIPS 
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 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The most common delay factors, which caused delays to projects in Saudi Arabia, 
can be solved via the application of BV PIPS. Most importantly, delay factors are solved 
through phases. These phases have many filters that help owners find good vendors based 
on their performance. These filters prevent delays in the construction of public projects in 
Saudi Arabia by using only select, high-quality contractors. 14 important delay factors 
were found by comparing important delay factors that found in a literature review with 
the identified causes of delay in the the university and survey. The important delay factors 
are “delay in progress payments to contractors,” “bidding system (low price),” “lack of 
project budget,” “delayed payment to laborers,” “concurrent projects,” “owner’s late 
design document review and approval,” “poor consultant performance,” “manpower 
shortage,” “contactor lacked project management skills,” “poor contractor performance,” 
“lack experience of contractors,” “inadequate contractor qualifications,” “material 
delivery,” and “lack of consultancy employees”. One of these significant factors is the 
low bid system, which was ranked second with a recorded FI of (89.3).  
 
The low-bid method and results lead to significant costs for the Saudi Arabian 
government because lowest bids do not reflect the actual price of projects. In cases 
involving a university, total cost overruns totaled $31,355,923 in just four projects, 
showing what occurs when contracts are awarded on price alone. Paradoxically, when the 
government wishes to save money by awarding projects to the lowest bidders, these 
projects end up costing a significant amount of money and experience numerous delays. 
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Change Orders, Client’s Change of Scope, and Bid Proposal Errors are the most 
important causes of cost overruns in Saudi Arabia. These risk factors were rated via 761 
classified contactors and 43 universities representatives. Conversely, BVA and PIPS 
display a high level of construction performance with 100% of such projects staying 
within budget and being completed on time with 0% change orders.  
 
Saudi Arabian project performance is negatively affected by the low-bid 
procurement system. Satisfaction of the current (low-bid) procurement system is poor, as 
shown by 761 surveyed classified contractors and 43 universities’ representatives. Price 
should not be the only evaluation factor. Contractors and universities’ representatives 
both supported using BV PIPS elements for the procurement process. Level of experience 
(LE), risk assessment (RA), and value added (VA) documents help owners to assess 
contractors’ performances using dominant metrics. When a contractor moves to the 
clarification phase, owners should interview the project manager, and contractors should 
submit the project’s scope, technical schedule, milestone schedule, and risk management 
plan. In this phase, the owner should know if the contractors are experts or not. After the 
contractor passes the clarification phase, the next phase is execution. Here, contractors 
should submit a weekly risk report (WRR) and director’s report (DR) to document the 
contractor’s performance to evaluate contractors in the future. All these requirements 
received a high rating on the frequency index, about 89 and above, when 804 classified 
contractors and universities’ representatives were surveyed. This study recommends 
clients run projects in Saudi Arabia using this proposed BV PIPS procurement system. 
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APPENDIX A 
CAUSES OF DELAY FACTORS 
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Client-related causes of delay 
1. Owner's interference 
2. Owner's personality 
3. Negotiation by knowledgeable people 
4. Delay in progress payments by owner 
5. Late in revising and approving design documents by owner 
6. Poor coordination by owner with the various parties during construction 
7. Excessive bureaucracy by owner's administration 
8. Clarity of scope of change 
9. Delay in the settlement of contractor claims by owner 
10. Poor coordination by owner and other parties 
11. Conflicts between joint-ownership of the project 
12. Delay to furnish and deliver the site to contractor by owner 
13. Difficulties in obtaining work permits 
14. Variations in quantities 
15. Suspension of work by owner 
16. Delay in approving sample materials by owner 
17. Delay in approving shop drawings by owner 
18. Uncooperative owner with contractor complicating contract administration 
19. Delay in issuance of change orders by owner 
20. Owner's failure to coordinate with Government authorities during planning 
21. Non-payment of contractor claim 
22. Interference by owner in the construction operations 
23. Poor communication by owner and other parties 
24. Lack of finance to complete the work by client 
25. Slow decision making by owner 
26. Owner's poor communication with construction parties and government 
authorities 
27. Key personal replaced 
  
Contractor-related causes of delay 
28. Rework due to errors during construction 
29. Delay in site mobilization 
30. Internal company problems 
31. Company organization 
32. Other work on hold 
33. Loose safety rules and regulations within the contractor's organization 
34. Ineffective scheduling of project by contractor 
35. Cash flow management 
36. Improper construction methods implemented by contractor 
37. Inefficient quality control by contractor 
38. Increased number of projects 
39. Increase in contractor's overheads 
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40. Poor site management and supervision by contractor 
41. Delays in sub-contractors' work 
42. Delay in the preparation of contractor submissions 
43. Improper technical study by contractor during the bidding stage 
44. Ineffective planning by contractor 
45. Ineffective contractor head office involvement in the project 
46. Replacement of key personal 
47. Delay of field survey by contractor 
48. Conflicts between contractor and other parties (consultant and owner) 
49. Conflicts in sub-contractors' schedules in execution of project 
50. Contractor's poor coordination with the parties involved in the project 
51. Inadequate contractor's work 
52. Poor communication by contractor with the parties involved in the project 
53. Poor communication by contractor with other parties 
54. Poor coordination by contractor with other parties 
55. Difficulties in financing project by contractor 
56. Ineffective control of the project progress by the contractor 
57. Frequent change of sub-contractors because of their inefficient work 
58. Frauds 
59. Inefficient Work-break down structure 
60. Poor qualification of the contractor's technical staff 
61. Contractor experience 
  
Consultant-related causes of delay 
62. Delay in performing inspection and testing by consultant 
63. Delay in approving major changes in the scope of work by consultant 
64. Poor coordination between consultant and other parties 
65. Poor communication between consultant and other parties 
66. Late in reviewing and approving design documents by consultant 
67. Inflexibility (rigidity) of consultant 
68. Company organization 
69. Replacement of key personnel 
70. Conflicts between consultant and design engineer 
71. Frauds 
72. Internal company problems 
73. Inadequate experience of consultant 
  
Materials-related causes of delay 
74. Delay in materials delivery 
75. Late procurement of materials 
76. Damage of sorted material while they are needed urgently 
77. Changes in materials prices 
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78. Changes in materials specifications 
79. Shortage of materials required 
80. Late in selection of finishing materials due to availability of many types in market 
81. Shortage of construction materials in market 
82. Delay in manufacturing special building materials 
  
Labor-related causes of delay 
83. Low productivity level of labor 
84. Shortage of contractor's administrative personnel 
85. Personal conflicts among labor 
86. Nationality of labor 
87. Inadequate equipment used for the works 
88. Shortage of technical professionals in the contractor's organization 
89. Shortage of equipment required 
90. Failure of equipment 
91. Shortage of supporting and shoring installations for excavations 
92. Low productivity and efficiency of equipment 
93. Low level of equipment-operator's skill 
94. Lack of high-technology mechanical equipment 
95. Shortage of manpower (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled labor) 
96. Poor qualification of the contractor's technical staff assigned to the project 
97. The required labor skills are not available 
98. The required equipment and tools are not available 
99. Low skill of manpower 
  
Contract/relationships-related causes of delay 
100. Ineffective delay penalties 
101. Unavailability of incentives for contractor for finishing ahead of schedule 
102. The objective of the project is not well defined 
103. Legal disputes between various parties 
104. The scope of work is not well defined 
105. Type of construction contract 
106. Conflict between contract documents 
107. Type of project bidding and award (negotiation, lowest bidder) 
108. Inadequate definition of substantial completion 
109. Lack of communications between the parties 
110. Original contract duration is too short 
111. Inappropriate overall organization structure linking all parties to the project 
112. Major disputes and negotiations 
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Others 
113. Quality management system and assurance control 
114. The consultant attempting to hide their mistake when the quantity amount 
changes 
115. Insufficient allowance for employees' holidays in the schedule 
116. Inadequate original contract duration 
117. Lack of clarity of drawings and specifications 
118. Client need to analyze the causes of change 
119. The lack of experienced engineers engaged by consultants for high-tech work 
120. Insufficient numbers of contractors to build the increasing number of 
construction projects in Saudi Arabia 
121. Insufficient consideration of the behavior of people 
122. Lack of regular meetings 
123. Unclear scope of work to be done by staff contractors 
124. High turn-over of personnel in Saudi Arabia 
125. Insufficient study of all the details and capacity of the contractor before 
selection by client 
126. Overdependence on the lowest tender amount in contractor selection 
127. Discrepancies between bill of quantities, specifications and drawings 
128. Level of salary of consultant staff 
129. Lack of ethics 
130. Delayed salary payments to staff 
131. Designer engineer selection of special building materials not available in the 
local market. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY 
  
89 
 
Part 1 Instructions: Please rate project delay causes in Saudi Arabian universities, with 
1 meaning “not common,” 5 meaning “don’t know,” and 10 meaning “common.” Please 
only use one of these three choices for each question.  
 
Criteria 
Rating  
(1, 5, or 10) 
Bidding System (Low Price)   
Poor Contractor Performance   
Lack of Experienced Contractors   
Manpower Shortage   
Inadequate Contractor Qualifications   
Material Delivery   
Owner’s Late Design Document Review and Approval   
Delay in Progress Payments to Contractors   
Lack of Consultancy Employees   
Lack of Vision   
Design Requirements Do Not Reflect Reality   
Owner Controlled Designer   
Lack of Project Budget   
Owner’s Wrong Decision Making   
Owner Did Not Follow Solidarity Conditions   
Inadequate Project Management Department   
Changing Consultant During Implementation   
Conflict among Company Partners   
Contractor Did Not Study Proposal   
Contactor Lacked Project Management Skills   
Contractor Ability   
Concurrent Projects   
Delayed Payment to Laborers   
Poor Consultant Performance   
Consultant Delayed Project to Extend His or Her Contract with Owner   
Unclear Procurement System   
New Worker Regulations   
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Part 2 Instructions: please rate the causes of cost overruns to projects in Saudi Arabian 
universities, with 1 meaning “not common,” 5 meaning “don’t know,” and 10 meaning 
“common.” Please only use one of these three choices for each question.  
 
Criteria Rating (1-5 or 10) 
Client’s Change of Scope 
 Unforeseen risks 
 Change Orders   
Bid Proposal Errors   
Contractor’s Errors   
Consultant’s Errors   
Dividing Bids into Several Parts   
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Part 3 Instructions: please fill in the survey below by providing a rating per question. 1 
means you “disagree,” 5 means you “don’t know,” and 10 means you “agree.” Please 
only use one of these three choices for each question.  
 
No Questions Rating (1-5 or 10) 
Current Procurement System 
1 I have high satisfaction with the current procurement system  
2 
Do you think selecting contractors solely based on price is the 
optimal practice for procuring services?  
Best Value Principles  
1 
Do you think selecting contractors based on performance with price 
would be better?  
2 
Would you support improvements to the current procurement system 
that selects contractors based on performance with price?  
3 
I would you be interested in learning more about a new procurement 
model that may improve the current procurement system by 
identifying and utilizing expertise. 
 
New Proposed Procurement System Improvements 
1 
In addition to evaluating price, would requiring contractors to 
submit verifiable performance information improve the procurement 
process? 
  
2 
In addition to evaluating price, would requiring contractors to 
submit potential risks they foresee on the project and how they will 
mitigate and manage them improve the procurement process? 
 
3 
In addition to evaluating price, would requiring contractors to 
propose ways they can add value to a project in their proposal 
improve the procurement process? 
 
4 
During the clarification period, would interviewing the selected 
contractor’s project manager performing the work improve the 
procurement process? 
 
5 
During the clarification period, would requiring the selected 
contractor to provide a project plan from beginning to end, including 
scope of work, technical and milestone schedule, major risks that 
fall outside of that scope before they receive a contract, and how 
they will measure their performance, improve the procurement 
process? 
 
6 
During the execution of a project, would project performance 
increase if contractors measured their performance (time, cost, 
quality) weekly and submitted to clients? 
  
7 
Would it be beneficial if the government documented all 
performance on projects and posted the performance for all 
contractors to compare? 
  
8 
Would these new procurement processes improvements help to 
identify expertise and use it to improve overall performance on 
projects? 
 
 
